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Abstract 
 This thesis examines the role of poverty in the United States and how it has 
impacted social and economic systems. It explores how U.S. poverty measurements 
developed in the 1960s may not be accurately measuring poverty now, and the ways in 
which these measures could be improved upon. This work also reviews literature on 
health and educational inequities stemming from socioeconomic class, and the role these 
play in long-term economic mobility. Finally, it analyzes how larger social institutions 
like mass incarceration and capitalism have developed around poverty, and the role they 
play in maintaining its prevalence today. This thesis finds that systemic barriers to 
economic mobility play a much larger role in the persistence of poverty than the actions 
and behaviors of individuals experiencing poverty. Without addressing poverty as such 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
While the United States has spent trillions of dollars over the last 55 years in 
efforts to alleviate poverty, it does a significantly worse job than a majority of other 
developed countries (Chaudry et al., 2016). In 2017, 40 million individuals were 
considered to be impoverished in the United States, around 12% of the total population, 
while 18.5 million individuals lived in deep poverty with a household income of less than 
half the federal poverty measure (Fox, 2018). The U.S. has the largest percentage of 
households considered to be in deep poverty of any Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) country (Fox, 2019). U.S. social safety nets are 
less effective than other countries, with more than 20% of children in the US remaining 
below the poverty threshold after receiving government benefits, compared to just 3.6% 
of children in Finland (The Economist, 2019). Children are the age demographic most 
likely to experience poverty in the U.S. 13 million, or 17.5% of all children live in 
poverty (Fox, 2019), and half of all children in the U.S. are expected to at one point live 
in a home where families are receiving food stamps (Rank, 2011). The bottom 60% of 
income earners in the U.S. have access to less than 1% of the total financial wealth in the 
country (Rank, 2011). The United States exists in a state of paradox, as being one of the 
wealthiest countries in the world, having the highest rate of poverty of any developed 
country, and seeing vast inequality of wealth.In a 2018 New York Times article, 
economist Angus Deaton explored how poverty in the United States compares globally. 
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poverty in developing countries is often discussed as though it is an entirely different 
experience than poverty in developed countries like the U.S.; Deaton uses data to analyze 
whether this is a false dichotomy or not (Deaton, 2018). As of October 2017, the World 
Bank began to include high-income countries in their global estimates of poverty, 
allowing for direct comparison between developed and developing countries. In 2013, the 
World Bank found that 769 million total individuals lived on less than $1.90 a day in the 
world, and 3.2 million of these individuals lived in the U.S. (Deaton, 2018). The United 
States is an urban and individualistic society with a colder climate, which can exacerbate 
the experience of poverty for those living there. Villagers in India spend little to nothing 
on housing, heat, and childcare, some of the greatest burdens on income in the U.S. 
(Deaton, 2018). Economist Robert Allen used the World Bank data to develop a needs-
based absolute poverty line, accounting for these differences in culture and climate, and 
finding that $1.90 in poorer countries actually translated to $4.00 a day in wealthier 
countries (Deaton, 2018). Using this updated measure, 5.3 million Americans are 
determined to be absolutely poor by global standards (Deaton, 2018). This number places 
the United States absolute poverty rate above Sierra Leone and Nepal, equal with 
Senegal, and just below Angola (Deaton, 2018).   
This quantitative analysis reflects the qualitative assessments of poverty being 
completed in the U.S. In the book Two Dollars a Day, Professors Kathryn Edin and Luke 
Schaefer document the experience many families have in both rural and urban 
communities in the U.S., living on two dollars a day. Sociologist Matthew Desmond 
intimately depicts the process of eviction and its long-lasting trauma on families 
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burdened with finding housing and paying rent in his book Evicted. Both books have 
been widely acclaimed for their portrayals of poverty in the U.S., and the systemic 
barriers faced by those experiencing it.  
Individuals in wealthier countries live longer and happier lives overall, however, 
life expectancies in some areas of the U.S., like Harlem, the Mississippi Delta, and 
Appalachia, are lower than in Bangladesh and Vietnam (Deaton, 2018). In poor 
communities in the U.S., health essentials like clean water, uncontaminated food, 
sanitation, and access to medical care are more likely to be found inadequate or lacking 
(Deaton, 2018). These communities continue to experience worsening health outcomes, 
falling life expectancies, and increasing mortality rates from drugs, alcohol, and suicide 
(Deaton, 2018). In the United States, the suffering caused by material deprivation, poor 
health, and other problems stemming from poverty is equivalent to that experienced in 
the poorest countries around the world. 
While fiscal conservatives in the U.S. describe poverty as a self-imposed problem 
for a small group of individuals and communities, in reality, it impacts the entire country. 
By ‘othering’ the experience of poverty and going to great lengths to render its realities 
invisible, increasingly more time and resources are needed to address the social issues it 
creates. Health and educational inequities, family and community instability, and mass 
incarceration cause everyone to pay the price for poverty, whether they are aware of it or 
not (Rank, 2011). An estimate of the current annual economic costs of childhood poverty, 
accounting for future earnings, probability of engaging in crime, and long-term health 
outcomes, total $500 billion, a number equal to 4% of total U.S. GDP (Rank, 2011). 
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Professor David Grusky of Stanford University says that the state of California, which 
has the highest share of individuals experiencing poverty after accounting for taxes, 
transfers, and cost of living, could end deep child poverty with targeted cash transfers of 
$2.8 billion per year, a quarter of the sum the state spends on prisons (The Economist, 
2019). The by-products of poverty are paid for by the larger society as the core causes are 
left unaddressed.  
Individuals living in the U.S. have a high likelihood of directly encountering 
poverty in their lifetime. An analysis from Mark Robert Rank and Thomas Hirschl found 
that for individuals ages 20-75 in the U.S., 60% will live below the poverty line for one 
year while 75% will spend at least one year at or near the poverty line (Rank, 2011). 
Throughout adulthood, two-thirds of the U.S. population will receive social welfare 
benefits like SNAP and Medicaid for a minimum total of 5 years (Rank, 2011). The risk 
of individuals falling below the poverty line in their lifetime has been rising since the 
1990s, with families experiencing greater income volatility, labor market instability, and 
less access to benefits (Rank, 2011). A majority of the U.S. population will need to 
access the social safety net throughout their lives.  
Recent anti-poverty measures in the U.S. have been largely ineffective, with the 
last four decades of social policies failing to reduce poverty rates (Rank, 2011). The 
following thesis will explore the political, social, and economic factors which have 
created stagnant poverty rates. The gaps between extreme prosperity and impoverishment 
have never been greater in the U.S., with a large number of individuals experiencing 
severe material deprivation and hardship while a small percentage of the population lives 
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in excessive wealth and abundance. The systemic issues that create and reproduce 
poverty in the U.S. are not being accurately represented in our current measures or 
discourse. By accurately depicting, measuring, and understanding poverty in the United 
States, the capacity to address it becomes much greater. Poverty in the United States is 
the result of intentional and intersectional policies created within an economic structure 
that places the burden of profit on to the backs of those with the least access to resources. 
 This thesis looks at the role of poverty in U.S. society and the ways in which it 
exists and persists in spite of and because of the current political, economic, and social 
institutions. It will analyze how poverty and inequality in the U.S. are a result of political 
and larger systemic structures. This thesis will look at (1) the relevancy and accuracy of 
modern U.S. poverty reporting measures and how these are tied to both effective and 
ineffective policymaking; (2) the long-term social and economic impacts of poverty, 
particularly focusing on the long-term impacts of childhood experiences of poverty; and 




Chapter 2: Case Study - Freddie Gray 
 While data and research are an important piece of framing what poverty looks like 
and how it impacts individuals and families in the U.S., it is of equal value to learn how 
these factors intimately affect someone’s life course. This is not to say that individuals 
have no agency in their own lives or that their choices are not their own, however, it is 
important to understand the factors and experiences that preclude individual decision 
making. As an example of this, the following section will detail the life of Freddie Gray, 
a Black man from West Baltimore who ultimately was killed in police custody at the age 
of 26 and whose death sparked a wave of protests in his home community. Because of the 
role he played in that community and the outrage over his death, much work has been 
done to ascertain more details about his life and the circumstances that surrounded it.  
In Raj Chetty and Nathaniel Hendren’s work on economic mobility, Baltimore 
city is ranked absolutely last in economic mobility for children from low-income 
households (Badger, 2015). For each year a poor boy grows up in Baltimore, their adult 
earnings will fall by an estimated 1.5% (Badger, 2015). Assuming an individual spent 
their entire childhood there, a 26-year-old man in Baltimore would be expected to earn 
28% less than in an average city in the U.S. (Badger, 2015).  
 Freddie Gray and his twin sister were born in 1989, two months premature, to a 
mother living in West Baltimore. Their mother, Gloria Darden, struggled with dyslexia 
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and told lawyers she could not read at all; neither she nor her parents had graduated from 
high school (Mora, 2015). Gloria also struggled with substance use and had used heroin
 since the age of 23, implying use during her pregnancy with the twins (Mora, 2015). 
When she gave birth, the premature twins were required to stay at the hospital for two 
months to gain weight before she was able to bring them home (Mora, 2015). Gloria 
relied on disability checks as the sole income for the family, and later on, when Gloria 
was in treatment for substance use, their home was found without food or electricity 
(Anft, 2015). They lived in old public housing apartments with crumbling walls covered 
in lead paint; she later described every surface as being coated with a layer of paint flakes 
(Mora, 2015). The family’s rent was based on a verbal agreement with an older man, 
giving them no official documents or legal recourse (Mora, 2015).  
Before his second birthday, Freddie had tested positive for concentrations of lead 
in his blood of 37 micrograms per deciliter of fluid, more than seven times the level that 
is believed to cause severe and permanent brain damage in children (Ross, 2015). Dan 
Levy, an assistant professor of pediatrics at Johns Hopkins University told one news 
outlet “The fact that Mr. Gray had these high levels of lead in all likelihood affected his 
ability to think and to self-regulate and profoundly affected his cognitive ability to 
process information. And the real tragedy of lead is that the damage it does is 
irreparable,” (Ross, 2015). According to the CDC, Black infants will be exposed to lead 
poisoning at a rate 60% higher than white infants (McCoy, 2015). When Baltimore City 
health officials initially began testing for elevated blood lead levels in children, they were 
looking for anything above 20 micrograms; now child health experts believe anything 
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above 5 micrograms can significantly stunt a child’s cognitive development (McCoy, 
2015). In 1993, 13,000 children in Baltimore were found to have lead poisoning, but 
given this updated threshold, that number turns into 30,000 (McCoy, 2015). In the last 
two decades, Baltimore has documented lead poisoning in more than 93,000 children 
(McCoy, 2015). Childhood lead poisoning increases the chance children will drop out of 
school by seven and the chances they are involved in the juvenile justice system by six 
(McCoy, 2015). In the neighborhood Freddie grew up in, the incidence of dangerously 
elevated blood lead levels was more than twice the figure for the entire city of Baltimore 
(McCoy, 2015). 
Freddie Gray grew up in the neighborhood of Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park 
in West Baltimore. According to statistics from 2012, Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park 
had an unemployment rate of 51.8% for individuals 16-64 (Petteruti, Kajstura, Schindler, 
Wagner & Ziedenberg, 2015). The median household income was $24,006 and 25% of 
families received TANF (Petteruti et al., 2015). Almost 50% of 9th-12th grade students 
were chronically absent throughout the year and 61% of the adult population had less 
than a high school diploma (Petteruti et al., 2015). The area received an average of 465 
narcotics calls for service per 1,000 residents, and the mortality rate for 15-24-year-olds 
was 19 per 1,000 youth (Petteruti et al., 2015). 7.4% of children ages zero to six had 
elevated blood-lead levels, and one in four juveniles in Sandtown has been arrested (Anft, 
2015). The life expectancy in the area was 68.8 years and the violent crime rate was 23 
per 1,000 residents (Petteruti et al., 2015). 33% of residential properties in the area were 
vacant or abandoned (Petteruti et al., 2015). Sandtown sees more of its residents sent to 
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jail than any other Census tract in the state (Anft, 2015), with a total of 458 individuals 
from the area incarcerated at the time, at a total annual cost of $16,946,000 (Petteruti et 
al., 2015). Given those same funds, the city could cover substance use disorder treatment 
for 3,771 adults, employment training for 3,389 individuals, one month of rent for 13,535 
families, or enroll 16,946 students in GED courses (Petteruti et al., 2015). 
Once enrolled in school, Freddie was diagnosed with ADHD and impulse control 
issues and moved to the special education curriculum. He dropped out of school in ninth 
grade and though he briefly returned during tenth grade, he never graduated from high 
school (Mora, 2015). Freddie Gray attended Carver Vocational Technical High School, 
considered to be an apartheid school which is defined as having a less than 1% white 
student body. At Carver, 98.7 % of the students are Black (Gross, 2015). Almost 50 % of 
teachers are reported as being absent for more than 10 days during the school year and 20 
% are considered inexperienced or are teaching for the first time (Gross, 2015). At Walt 
Whitman, a majority white school with high-income students located in Bethesda, 
Maryland, 30 miles from West Baltimore, just 9 % of teachers are recorded as being 
absent for more than 10 days (Gross, 2015). Apartheid schools tend to be economically 
segregated as well, with almost 80 % of students at Carver qualifying for free and 
reduced lunch (Gross, 2015). While Carver has a four-year graduation rate of 85%, the 
average student scores from the school fall in the bottom 6% of national SAT results 
(Mora, 2015).  
Sociologist Peter J. Cookson has noted the instrumental role schools play in 
institutionalized racism and class stratification in the U.S. (Gross, 2015). Physical 
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segregation is harmful to students, and they also face disparities in building safety, 
extracurricular activities, quality of education, and funding (Gross, 2015). In 2011, 88 
students from Carver were suspended while Walt Whitman, a school with twice as many 
students, suspended just 40 (Gross, 2015). This is consistent with data from the U.S. 
Department of Education and work by the ACLU showing non-white kids experience 
discipline, suspension, expulsion, and arrest at significantly higher rates than white 
students (Gross, 2015). Freddie struggled in school and before he was 18, he had not only 
been suspended from school several times but had also had several encounters with 
police (Gross, 2015).  
Police in the area knew him by name and he served time for several charges. 
Records from the Baltimore Division of Probation and Parole detail at least 10 arrests 
during his first year of probation, ultimately costing him his freedom (Mora, 2015). He 
was arrested for crimes involving drugs, illegal gambling, and violating his probation. 
Because they could not afford to make bail, Freddie’s family was forced to work with 
bail bondsmen, agree to bail installment plans, take out payday loans, or use legal 
settlement buy-outs (Ross, 2015). His family and friends paid a minimally estimated 
$29,000 to private bail agents over the course of his short life (Mora, 2015). When he 
was unable to make bail, he was left in jail as a form of punishment. Arrests and policing 
efforts in a community like West Baltimore are often determined by public opinions. 
People outside of communities like West Baltimore, are often vocal about what they 
consider to be safety concerns and can influence where public funding goes, which is 
often policing and arrests of poor and non-white communities and individuals (Ross, 
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2015). During the Spring of the year Freddie died, the Baltimore City State’s Attorney 
had asked for the police precincts in the areas to crack down on street activity (Anft, 
2015). Police in the area were known to go out of their way to humiliate young men 
during arrests, creating an even deeper divide between police and the community. 
Having a record made it difficult for Freddie to find work. Even though he 
learned masonry skills while he was in jail, the apprenticeship programs in the area 
would not consider individuals with criminal convictions for jobs (Ross, 2015). 
Individuals with police records are half as likely to be able to secure work as individuals 
without a record (Anft, 2015). In areas like Sandtown, where an ever-increasing 
percentage of the population is deemed “unemployable”, crime becomes one of the only 
viable alternatives. In 2008, a suit was filed on behalf of Freddie and his sisters, stating 
they had suffered “irreversible brain damage” due to poisoning from lead paint in their 
public housing (Mora, 2015). The Gray siblings each received six-figure settlement sums, 
parsed out into monthly payments (Anft, 2015). Freddie was dependent upon the “lead 
checks” he received from his civil lawsuit settlement; he paid his family between $300 
and $600 a month for rent and stated his entire monthly income was the $608 he received 
monthly from his settlement (Mora, 2015). This would have put his yearly income at 
$7,200, almost half of what the federal government would consider to be poverty level 
(Mora, 2015). In 2013, the Gray children sold the rights to their future payments to a 
company that offered immediate payouts; both sisters gave up $435,000 for a one-time 
check of $54,000 while Freddie sold $146,000 for an immediate $18,000 (Anft, 2015).  
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Freddie continued to have run-ins with the police and was charged with a number 
of minor crimes. His final arrest occurred on April 12, 2015. He was arrested after 
running from police officers who stated that even with no drugs on him, his flight and 
presence in a known open-air drug market were sufficient enough ‘probable cause’ to 
make an arrest (Ross, 2015). While Freddie was being put into the police van, he 
requested the use of his inhaler for his asthma. It is worth noting that one of the officers 
involved in the arrest and subsequent death of Freddie Gray grew up just blocks away 
from him. William Porter grew up in West Baltimore and was also diagnosed with 
elevated blood lead levels in his childhood. His mother was able to move their family to a 
middle-class North Baltimore neighborhood when he was in fifth grade.  
All of these details paint a poor picture of who Freddie Gray actually was, and the 
same can be said of all the statistics put forward in this paper. They cannot fully or 
accurately depict the lives and experiences of individuals who are experiencing poverty 
or living in low-income households and communities. The purpose of detailing this 
information is not to remove agency or responsibility from individuals, but rather to 
create a broader understanding of the barriers that are currently being placed on certain 
communities by society. There is the capacity to ensure that no other children are 
exposed to lead in their homes, to give public schools equal access to funding regardless 
of the economic success of a surrounding neighborhood, to provide quality healthcare to 
all, and to start questioning where many of our implicit biases around poverty and 
socioeconomic status come from.  
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Freddie Gray was an important and well-liked person in his community. Friends 
and neighbors described him as funny, charismatic, generous, respectful, and easygoing 
(Anft, 2015). Sandtown-Winchester is known to be a close-knit community where 
everyone knows and takes care of each other. Freddie played basketball and football in 
the community and in school. He talked about going to community college or even 
getting a job in law enforcement (Anft, 2015). His friends said he was always playing 
jokes on them and when people were struggling, he would buy them groceries (Anft, 
2015). He checked in on older neighbors and bought new tennis shoes for kids in the 
neighborhood (Anft, 2015). Gray was working at a food pantry in the community before 
his arrest (Washington, 2015). Many of his neighbors stated they would not think twice 
about helping if he asked. He was a product of his neighborhood, schools, homes, and 
police, and he experienced poverty, segregation, lead poisoning, unemployment, and 
police brutality. Freddie Gray’s death left a complicated legacy and publicly exposed not 
only the structural constraints that the poor face in their own life but also a set of 
constraints that exist before they are even born. The following thesis will explore some of 
the social and systemic factors that play out in the lived experiences of people like 




Chapter 3: Measurements of Poverty and the U.S. Poverty Threshold 
The official U.S. poverty threshold is almost universally viewed as an antiquated 
and inaccurate measure (Blank, 2008). Since the measure was initially developed in the 
1960s, methods have not been updated, resource measures have not been analyzed, and 
geographical differences remain unaccounted for. An inaccurate measurement process 
leads to a lack of understanding of what poverty looks like, as well as a question as to 
what is actually being measured. A huge question for social scientists and politicians is 
the efficacy of anti-poverty measures, and in order to understand interventions and 
outcomes, the statistical process of measuring poverty should capture the impact of anti-
poverty programs and policies. The current measure is insensitive to policy changes and 
thus fails to analyze whether policies aimed at alleviating poverty are effective in 
reducing it. Whether the goal is to accurately describe the lived experiences of 
individuals, politically affect change on that which is being measured, or forecast future 
economic and social conditions, an accurate measurement of poverty is necessary. As 
long as an outdated and inaccurate measure of poverty continues to be used, poverty will 
remain fundamentally misunderstood and will fail to be addressed in the United States. 
Development of the U.S. Poverty Measure 
Poverty is generally defined as the experience of economic and material 
deprivation. In highly industrialized and developed countries, poverty is most often 
measured from an income-based perspective rather than as an outcome-based measure
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like consumption or well-being. While income-based measures assess the single variable 
of household income relative to a benchmark or threshold, outcome-based measures of 
poverty can variably account for individuals’ ability to purchase and consume goods and 
services necessary to maintain stable housing, engage in the community, maintain 
necessary health and well-being, and raise children (Blank, 2008).  
Implementing an income-based poverty measure requires policymakers and 
researchers to agree upon certain criteria: poverty thresholds, resource measures, the level 
and period of time at which income is aggregated, and the distinction in household sizes. 
Poverty thresholds are the line below which individuals and households are considered to 
be experiencing economic deprivation or poverty. The United States uses an absolute 
measure of poverty, which remains fixed in real terms at an annual income of $25,926 in 
2019 dollars or $3,200 in 1965 dollars for a family of four (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020). 
The U.S. first developed poverty thresholds in the 1960s. Mollie Orshansky, an 
economist at the Social Security Administration, was tasked with developing an 
economic measure of poverty for President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty 
initiatives (Blank, 2008). In 1963, Orshansky developed a poverty threshold at three 
times the subsistence food budget for a family of four. The subsistence food budget came 
from an Economy Food Plan developed by the USDA in 1961, meant to establish a 
“temporary or emergency budget used when funds are low” (Blank, 2008). This measure 
was deemed appropriate at the time, as according to the 1955 Household Food 
Consumption Survey, the average U.S. family of four spent a third of post-tax income on 
food (Blank, 2008).  
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Resource measures refer to the household resources which are counted as 
contributing to income measures; depending on how this is defined, it can account for 
pre- or post-tax income, cash transfers, and non-cash transfers. In the U.S., the main 
discussion around resource measures centers on whether in-kind cash programs should be 
valued as cash, as well as whether income should be calculated at a post or pre-tax level 
(Blank, 2008). The sum of these resource measures is compared to the calculated poverty 
threshold, which in turn gives us the economic status of that family or household. The 
U.S. measure calculates the resources of all related cohabiters, family members, or co-
residents received over one calendar year (Blank, 2008). There is some debate about the 
merits of measuring these levels quarterly or in a different manner that accounts for 
seasonal differences to gain a better understanding of the fluctuations in income however 
an annual measure is not hotly contested. In order to address differing household sizes, 
the U.S. develops a threshold based on modal family size, and then calculates thresholds 
for households of varying sizes, using an equivalence scale to determine the relative 
income level (Blank, 2008). The equivalence scale is based on differences in food 
budgets and relative expenditures for different sized families (Blank, 2008). This was 
used to determine multiple poverty thresholds for varying household sizes based on the 
number of children and elderly and non-elderly household members (Blank, 2008).  
Annual poverty data and statistics are calculated using the current threshold and 
resource definitions. They are based upon the Annual Social and Economic Supplement 
of the Current Population Survey from the Census Bureau (Blank, 2008). In 1969, the 
Bureau of Budget, now the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), gave a directive 
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to the Census Bureau with the official poverty calculation method. The calculation 
method and threshold have been in place since the 1960s and are heavily integrated into 
the federal welfare system and a number of national statistics (Short, 2011). This makes 
them increasingly difficult to alter without causing significant ramifications throughout 
other governmental processes and systems (Short, 2011).  
The poverty threshold calculation differs from most other government-produced 
statistics, in that it is defined by OMB directive rather than by the agency producing the 
statistics itself, the Census Bureau. The outcome of this particular directive is that the 
Office of the President is the ultimate determinant in how poverty is calculated (Blank, 
2008). Other statistical agencies who produce data and analysis for the government have 
the authority to implement changes, improvements, and updates to the methodology at 
any point, while the Census Bureau is beholden to their original OMB directive (Blank, 
2008). Any change in the official poverty measurement necessitates a change in directive 
from the OMB, which falls under the Executive Office of the President (Blank, 2008). 
The White House has to directly sign off on any changes made to the calculation of the 
poverty threshold in the U.S. This is problematic, as the poverty measure can thus be 
vulnerable to political bias and act as a political rather than a statistical tool. No president 
has been willing to take the necessary measures to change the threshold since its 
inception in 1963. While there is the issue of welfare funding being tied to the official 
measure, any updated measure of poverty would be politically sensitive as it would most 
likely increase the number of poor in the U.S. 
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Since the 1963 thresholds were developed, they have remained constant in real 
terms, being adjusted annually using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Blank, 2008). As 
levels of economic growth have increased since the 1960s however, poverty thresholds 
have fallen relative to median incomes (Blank, 2008). In 1963, the poverty threshold for a 
family of four fell just below 50% median income in the U.S., but in 2005, the same 
poverty threshold is just 28% of median income, as seen in Figure 2-1 (Blank, 2008). In 
1965, 33 million individuals fell below the poverty threshold as compared to 38 million 
individuals in 2018 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). However, the associated percentage of 
the population that fell below the threshold was 17.3% in 1965 and 11.8% in 2018 (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2019). If poverty thresholds were determined relative to economic 
growth and median income levels, the numbers of individuals falling below the threshold 




Figure 2-1. Poverty threshold as a share of median income and as a share of the 20th percentile in the 
income distribution, 1959-2005. Reprinted from “PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: How to Improve Poverty 
Measurement in the United States,” by R. Blank, 2008. 
Real income growth in lower-income households has been slower than growth at 
median level income households. Additionally, there has been no evidence of real income 
growth at the 20th percentile of U.S. income since the mid-1970s (Blank, 2008). During 
the 1960s, there was a significant drop in the poverty rate from 22% to 12%, with the 
creation of the threshold measures and implementation of anti-poverty policies (Blank, 
2008). Since this drop in the 1960s, poverty levels have appeared to fluctuate with 
changes in the economy, ranging from 11% to 15%, rather than as an outcome of anti-
poverty measures (Blank, 2008).  
 The U.S. Official Poverty Measure (OPM) has become an increasingly 
impractical tool to measure poverty. It fails to accurately depict the number of households 
experiencing poverty and does not tell researchers the impacts of public welfare policies 
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and programs targeted at poverty alleviation. With poverty being a concept open to 
interpretation and subjective definitions, there exists a need for arbitrary assumptions to 
be made by those responsible for poverty calculations, as was originally done in 1965. A 
problem that has arisen is that these original assumptions have not evolved over the last 
60 years (Short, 2011). Federal, state, and local governments have gradually phased out 
usage of the exact OPM as an eligibility determinant for social welfare programs; 
eligibility is commonly set at 125% or even 200% of the OPM (O’Brien & Padulla, 
2010). While the OPM continues to act as a baseline for measurement and annual 
evaluation of the U.S. economy, it is becoming less and less indicative of the true 
numbers of individuals experiencing poverty. This begs the question of how else poverty 
could be measured in the U.S. to give its population and politicians a better idea of how it 
can be addressed. 
Critiques of the U.S. Poverty Measure 
There are a number of critiques of the U.S. poverty measurement from 
statisticians, economists, politicians, and advocacy groups (Blank, 2008). Realistically, 
numbers based on data from 1955 do not reflect modern expenditures or needs. The use 
of a single commodity, the price of food, to calculate the entire threshold also leaves it 
open for critique. Modern economists argue that the current multiplier of food costs 
would be much higher than the original three times the subsistence food budget if we 
wanted the relative threshold to accurately match the one developed in the 1960s. Food 
has become relatively cheaper and expenditures on food have declined as a share of 
household expenditures, with just under 13% of household pre-tax income spent on food 
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in 2005 (Blank, 2008). In order to hold the relative value of food as a base commodity 
and percentage of income-expenditure constant, the multiplier would have to have been 
increased to 7.8 in 2005 as opposed to the multiplier of three that was used. (Blank, 
2008).  
This is an approximate re-calculation of that measure. Since 1998, individual 
expenditures on food have remained relatively constant at around 10%, so it can be 
assumed that this 7.8 multiplier would still be relevant in 2019 (USDA, 2019). In January 
of 2019, the USDA determined that an annual “thrifty” food budget for a family of four 
would on average amount to $7,288.80 (USDA, 2019), and the annual poverty threshold 
for a family of 4 was calculated at $25,926 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020). Given the 
proposed change in the multiplier, this poverty threshold jumps to an annual income of 
$56,853. In the same year, median household income was $63,688 in the U.S. (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2019).  
To frame this calculation from another perspective, in 1960-61, 24% of income, 
of what is assumed to be the equivalent of a median-income household, was spent on 
food (BLS, 2006). The USDA “thrifty plan” measures about two-thirds of the moderate-
cost plan, which is assumed to be consistent with average household expenditure (USDA, 
2019). A “thrifty” USDA plan appears to be the basis for a subsistence food budget in the 
U.S. Given this information, it can be extrapolated that in 1960, a subsistence food 
budget would have cost a household 16% of average household income and the poverty 
threshold would have been 48% of average income. Using the same calculation, 48% of 
$63,688 is $30,570, still above the current federal measure. This is equivalent to a single 
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individual working full time and making $15 per hour or two people working full time at 
$7.50, just above the national minimum wage. 
Basing poverty measures on a single commodity makes the threshold highly 
sensitive to the relative price of that commodity. Changes in the costs of other 
increasingly expensive and necessary expenditures like housing or health care are not 
accounted for in this model, even though these expenditures have grown as a percentage 
of household spending as seen in Figure 2-2. Food expenditures as a percentage of 
income fell from 24% to 13% from 1960 to 2002 (Chao & Utgoff, 2006). At the same 
time, housing as a share of expenditure increased, and the ‘other’ category rose from 36% 
to 50% (Chao & Utgoff, 2006). 
 
Figure 2-2. Expenditure shares of Income in the U.S., New York, and Boston in 1960-61 and 2002-03. 
Reprinted from “100 Years of U.S. Consumer Spending Data for the Nation, New York City, and Boston,” 
by U.S. Department of Labor and U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006. 
23 
 
The OPM is impervious to government policies and anti-poverty measures. The 
1963 threshold measured cash income alone and was developed with a significantly 
different social transfer system than currently exists. While the original calculation 
looked solely at pre-tax income as a resource measure, due to the implementation of anti-
poverty policies and social welfare programs over the past 60 years, there now exist a 
number of income supports and resources available to lower-income households that are 
not accounted for in pre-tax income (Blank, 2008). In 1963, very few low-income1 
families paid federal taxes; in-kind programs such as food stamps, housing assistance, or 
Medicaid were relatively small or nonexistent in terms of income benefits, and cash and 
disposable income measured largely uniformly among low-income households (Blank, 
2008).  
A number of researchers in the fields of economics and public policy agree that 
the poverty threshold should reflect post-tax rather than pre-tax income levels, as this is a 
more accurate reflection of what households are able to spend (Blank, 2008). In 2017, 
50% of the U.S. federal budget went towards Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, 
and other marketplace subsidies, while 9% went into other safety net programs, over 2 
trillion dollars in total (CBPP, 2017). Since 1965, food stamps and housing benefits have 








 While low-income and low-SES as terms were not explicitly defined in every paper cited in this one, 
HUD defines low-income as 80% of the area median family income or 80% of the State nonmetropolitan 
median family income level, and this will be the general assumed meaning throughout this paper.  
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Care tax credits were introduced. Incorporating in-kind benefits would alter calculated 
income levels and allow for analysis of whether poverty measures are effective or not. As 
work expenses like childcare and transportation become increasingly costly and 
necessary, income calculations could exclude these costs to paint a better picture of the 
actual discretionary income households have. Data has reflected an outdated poverty 
measure, showing stagnating poverty rates since the 1970s and rendering the effects of 
changes in public spending nearly invisible (Blank, 2008). 
 In the 1960s, inflation raised nominal income for workers, pushing lower-income 
workers into higher tax brackets (Blank, 2008). During the 1980s, tax brackets were 
altered to allow for increased disposable income levels in households, however, no 
changes were made to the poverty calculation or resource measures, meaning this change 
in tax brackets was not adapted into the modern calculation of poverty thresholds (Blank, 
2008). The OPM needs modernization in order to provide more accurate information on 
the true number of low-income households and the fluctuation of poverty rates with 
economic cycles and distribution of social transfers. 
 The Official Poverty Measure does not reflect geographic variation in costs of 
living and poverty rates; it is constant across the country other than in Hawaii and Alaska 
(Blank & Greenberg, 2008). Individuals across the U.S. are measured according to the 
same threshold, meaning households in New York City are measured against the same 
line as those living in rural Colorado (Blank & Greenberg, 2008). Costs of living vary 
across the U.S. and are not accounted for in official poverty statistics.  
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Taking on loans and selling assets is not accounted for in material deprivation 
assessments. In 2007, total consumer debt, not accounting for loans secured by real 
estate, was approximately $2.5 trillion, or around $11,000 per adult living in the U.S. 
(Pressman & Scott, 2009). In recent decades, total consumer debt levels have increased at 
a rate of 4.1% per year as compared to the 0.6% annual median income growth 
(Pressman & Scott, 2009). In 2006, the OPM reported a poverty rate of 12.3% (Pressman 
& Scott, 2009). When accounting for individuals whose interest payments placed their 
disposable income levels below the poverty threshold, this number rises to 13.4%, or 
more than four million debt-poor individuals (Pressman & Scott, 2009). As an increasing 
amount of income goes towards paying interest rates on debts, and the poverty rate does 
not account for either debt or interest payments in its calculation of income level, more 
individuals in the U.S. have disposable income levels that fall below the poverty 
threshold than is currently indicated in the OPM.  
Several social scientists have put forward alternative and starkly different poverty 
measures in an attempt to move away from the OPM. Robert Rector, a fiscally 
conservative researcher who played a significant role in welfare reform during the 1990s, 
has argued that poverty should be based on material hardship. His calculation determined 
just 9.8% of single-parent families to be poor in 1999 (Blank, 2008). Conversely, 
economists and Drs. Trudi Renwick and Barbara Bergmann developed an alternative 
poverty threshold using a ‘basic needs budget’ for low-income, single-parent families. 
Their estimates found the poverty rate for single parents in 1993 to be 47% (Blank, 
2008). While the OPM remains disputable, counterclaims are easily made to its 
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relevance, and less valid methodologies can be held as equal to more accurate 
measurements.  
Efforts to Modernize the U.S. Poverty Measure 
Since 1965, there have been several attempts made to change how the U.S. 
poverty threshold is calculated. In 1976, the U.S. Department of Health Education and 
Welfare proposed changes to the resource definitions rather than the poverty threshold 
calculation (Blank, 2008). While these proposed changes were not incorporated into the 
official measure, they led to the calculation of alternative poverty thresholds by the U.S. 
Census Bureau (Blank, 2008). These alternative calculations look at in-kind income, 
post-tax measurements, as well as limited housing imputations, and have been produced 
annually alongside the OPM (Blank, 2008).  
In 1990, the Council of Economic Advisors under President George Bush 
proposed an initiative to improve the poverty measure. Under this initiative, the U.S. 
Congress commissioned the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to appoint a panel to 
make recommendations on improving the national poverty measure (Blank, 2008). The 
1995 NAS report noted several critiques of the poverty threshold and calculation.  
1) The income resource measure was not reflective of government policies that alter 
disposable income for families. By not accounting for payroll taxes and in-kind 
public benefit programs, the measure was not accurately determining poverty 
status (Short, 2011). 
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2) Poverty thresholds were not adjusting for increases in economic growth and 
standards of living; from 1963 to 1992, 50% median income had increased to 
more than 120% of the official poverty threshold (Short, 2011). 
3) The OPM did not consider any increases in expenses like transportation or 
childcare that are necessary to maintain employment (Short, 2011). 
4) The poverty measure did not account for variation in medical costs across 
demographics, health, and insurance coverage status, and increasing health care 
costs as a share of household expenditure (Short, 2011). 
5) Poverty thresholds use family size adjustments that are anomalous and fail to 
account for variation in the makeup of families and expenditures like child 
support (Short, 2011). 
6) The thresholds failed to adjust for geographic differences in the cost of living 
across the country (Short, 2011). 
The panel recommended the following changes to the poverty threshold measurement: 
1) Base the poverty threshold on household expenditures on necessities like food, 
housing, and clothing, and use a multiplier of 1.10 to 1.15 (Blank, 2008). 
2) Specify a point below the median distribution of aggregate expenditures on the 
identified necessities as a basis for a new poverty threshold (Blank, 2008). 
3) Measure income as post-tax cash income (+) the value of near-cash in-kind 
benefits (-) work expenses such as transportation and childcare (-) out of pocket 
medical expenses (Blank, 2008). 
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4) Update the poverty calculation regularly and use a quasi-relative poverty 
threshold (Blank, 2008). 
5) Produce a measure that explicitly details the effects of government spending and 
policies aimed at poverty reduction, accounting for tax and social transfer 
policies, in order to determine the effectiveness of such programs (Short, 2011). 
The NAS panel noted that while expenditures on necessities increase positively 
with income levels, this growth is slower than overall growth (Blank, 2008). They found 
the elasticity of expenditures on necessities to total income to be between .65 and .80 
(Citro & Michael, 1995). The panel was not in full agreement on how to address medical 
expenses, however, they recommended subtracting out of pocket medical expenses from 
income and recommended against imputing the value of public health insurance into the 
income of recipients (Blank, 2008). They acknowledged the difficulty of addressing 
geographic price differences, as the poverty threshold is used to determine eligibility for 
federal programs, and very few of those programs have geographically adjusted benefits 
(Blank, 2008). 
The NAS report resulted in the creation of 24 new experimental poverty 
calculations. Discussions around implementing the NAS recommendations were tabled 
during the Clinton administration for several reasons. These experimental measures 
included comparisons of measures across subgroups and found that the new populations 
included in the poverty threshold had a larger proportion of elderly individuals, working 
families, and married-couple families (Short, 2011). If changes were implemented, the 
distribution of individuals and households in poverty would significantly shift: there 
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would be (1) fewer poor among those receiving in-kind benefits, (2) a greater number of 
working poor if work expenses were removed from income, and (3) increases among the 
elderly poor, affected by changes to the equivalence scale and deductions of out of pocket 
medical costs (Blank, 2008). Public programs that used poverty rates to distribute and 
determine eligibility would be drastically affected by a change in its measurement. The 
largest support for changes in poverty measurement came from a small group of 
statisticians and economists, who do not make-up anyone’s primary constituency and are 
more easily ignored than larger sections of the population (Blank, 2008). Poverty 
measures were thus left unaltered. 
During the 2000s, the George W. Bush Administration launched the Project to 
Reconsider the Official Federal Poverty Measure. This group made the decision to stop 
producing the NAS experimental measures and publish their own set of alternative 
measures. The new measures focused exclusively on resource side changes and CPI 
adjustments, both leading to significantly lower poverty rate calculations (Blank, 2008). 
They also ended any effort to update threshold definitions and resource measures (Blank, 
2008). The outcome of this project was to continue to calculate and post NAS poverty 
rate measurements online as well as publish the new alternative measures (Blank, 2008). 
In March of 2010, an Interagency Technical Working Group (ITWG) in 
conjunction with the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) developed a number of 
Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) suggestions under the Obama administration. 
They concluded that SPM thresholds should be determined based on an actual dollar 
amount spent on a basic set of necessary goods: food, shelter, clothing, and utilities 
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(FCSU) and a small additional amount for household supplies, personal care, and non-
work-related transportation (Short, 2011). This threshold would be calculated using five 
years of data on expenditures for families with two children, utilizing Consumer 
Expenditure Survey data (Short, 2011). Using the equivalence scale, this threshold would 
then be adjusted for variation in households (Short, 2011). In the SPM, geographic 
variation and housing costs would be adjusted over time (Short, 2011). The poverty 
threshold would then be calculated to reflect any change in expenditures on the basic 
bundle goods at the 33rd percentile of expenditure distribution (Short, 2011). The 
workgroup determined the SPM household resources to be: the value of cash income (+) 
the value of in-kind benefits which could be used towards the basic bundle of goods 
(nutritional assistance, subsidized housing, home energy assistance), (-) the necessary 
expenses for critical goods or services which are not included in the thresholds (income 
taxes, social security payroll taxes, childcare/work-related expenses, child support 
payments, contributions towards the cost of medical care/health insurance 
premiums/medical out of pocket costs) (Short, 2011). The SPM did not replace the OPM, 
it was designed to provide politicians and economists further information on the 
aggregate levels of economic need in the country, within large subpopulations or 
locations, and to act as an additional macroeconomic statistic (Short, 2011). Table 1 
compares the OPM and SPM. 
The Census Bureau began publishing Supplemental Poverty Measure reports in 
2011. Similar to the OPM, SPM reports use the Current Population Survey Annual Social 
and Economic Supplements data (Fox, 2018). The 2017 SPM report found that the SPM 
31 
 
rate was 1.6% higher than the official rate of 12.3% (Fox, 2018). In 16 states, SPM rates 
were higher than the OPM, lower in 18, and 16 states saw no statistical difference 
between the two (Fox, 2018).  
Table 1. Comparison of Official and Supplemental Poverty Measures in the U.S. From “Supplemental 
Poverty Measure Report” by K. Short, 2011. 





All related individuals living at the same 
address, includes coresident unrelated 
children cared for by family and any 
cohabiters and their children 
Resource 
Measure 
Gross pre-tax cash 
income 
All cash income (+) in-kind benefits families 
can use towards FCSU goods (+/-) tax 
credits/taxes (-) work expenses (-) out-of-
pocket medical expenses 
Poverty 
Threshold 
3x cost of subsistence 
food diet in 1963 
33rd percentile of expenditures on FCSU of 
families with 2 children, multiplied by 1.2 
Threshold 
Adjustments 
Variation in family size, 
composition, age 
Geographical variation in housing costs and 




CPI: all items 
Five-year moving average of expenditures of 
FCSU 
 
The Supplemental Poverty Measure was found to have significantly different 
outcomes than the Official Poverty Measure. The SPM results saw a drop in the number 
of youths falling below the poverty threshold (Short, 2011). The SPM also measured a 
greater number of adults and elderly as falling below the threshold (Short, 2011). The 
SPM reported increased poverty rates for married-couple families, male householders, 
individuals identified as white, individuals identified as Asian, foreign-born individuals, 
homeowners with mortgages, and individuals without private health insurance (Short, 
2011). Geographically, the SPM found increased numbers of individuals below the 
threshold in suburbs, as well as in the Northeast and West (Short, 2011). Implementing 
in-kind measurements in the SPM measured a lower percentage of individuals in very 
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high or very low resource categories, and individuals falling below 50% of the SPM 
threshold (Short, 2011). Additionally, medical out-of-pocket expenses were determined 
to have a significant impact on SPM rates and well-being for individuals aged 65 and 
above (Short, 2011). The SPM produced higher overall poverty rates than the OPM 
(Short, 2011). 
Alternative Measures of Poverty to the U.S. 
A number of countries and institutions such as the E.U. and The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) utilize a relative poverty measure. 
Relative measures vary with income growth in the country; they look at cash income as a 
percentage of median income. They do not have to be based on an elasticity of poverty 
measure with respect to median income 1, meaning variation with income change can be 
less than 1 to 1. In the E.U., the at-risk poverty rate falls at a post-tax level of 60% of 
median income (Blank, 2008). As shown in Figure 2-3, the 2000 U.S. poverty rate of 
8.7% translates to 23.5% using the relative measure of the E.U. (Blank, 2008). A relative 
poverty measure highlights the actual spending power money may have in a country 
relative to levels of wealth (Blank, 2008). While relative poverty measures are easier to 
calculate because they are linked solely to incomes, they are difficult to use to make 
progress in alleviating poverty, as they shift with changes in the economy. Relative 
poverty measures can also be updated over time in accordance with the growth in median 
incomes and costs of living in a country. While relative measures of poverty more 
accurately represent economic and social fluctuations than absolute ones, there will never 
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be a single measure of poverty that does not require adaptation over time, which has led 
to the development of a number of measures of poverty. 
 
Figure 2-3. Relative and absolute poverty incidence across countries, 2000. Reprinted from 
“PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: How to Improve Poverty Measurement in the United States,” by R. Blank, 
2008. 
Drs. Sanders Korenman and Dahlia K. Remler have developed a health inclusive 
poverty measure (HIPM) in light of the enactment of the Affordable Care Act and its 
impact on poverty in the United States. They argue that neither the SPM nor the OPM 
accurately capture the effect the ACA has had on poverty. Both exclude health insurance 
benefits from the resource measure as well as fail to account for healthcare and insurance 
as a necessary cost in the poverty threshold (Korenman & Remler, 2016). The SPM 
measures whether income, including net medical out of pocket expenses, meets standards 
non-health needs. It is therefore only able to measure the ACA’s effects on poverty as it 
reduced medical out of pocket expenses (Korenman & Remler, 2016). The authors argue 
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that the current SPM may inaccurately reflect health care reform. The ACA transfers 
health insurance subsidies to lower-income individuals, however, it subtracts out of 
pocket premium payments from income and omits the value of health insurance benefits 
from resource definitions, potentially making low-income households “poorer” 
(Korenman & Remler, 2016). The HIPM proposes adding the unsubsidized price of basic 
health insurance to the SPM threshold of need, add net health insurance benefits, and 
subtract capped out-of-pocket medical expenditures from the resource measure 
(Korenman & Remler, 2016). Using this measure, researchers found that among 
individuals 65 and above, SPM-only poor will spend four times as much on health care as 
HIPM-only-poor. While this is an admirable development in the inclusion of health 
insurance in this calculation, it highlights the complexity of using a single quantitative 
measure to identify poverty thresholds. 
Multiple measures of disadvantage can be used to estimate poverty levels and 
household resources. Economic and social deprivation, poverty persistence, and 
education and health outcomes can all be utilized to estimate relative disadvantages for 
individuals and groups. These measures give agencies and governments a more well-
rounded picture of the state of deprivation and economic need in an area. It also reduces 
the dependence of measurement and resource distribution on a single poverty measure 
and accounts for multiple aspects of deprivation and need (Blank, 2008). Agencies in the 
United States already produce reports on food security, quality of housing, child well-
being, and educational achievement (Blank, 2008). They can use this data to identify key 
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indicators of poverty and factor a number of measures into the poverty threshold (Blank, 
2008).  
 Self-reported or subjective poverty thresholds are also used. Subjective poverty 
thresholds are developed by asking individuals two questions: the minimum income level 
they believe is necessary to not experience material deprivation, and a self-ranking of 
where they believe their own income level falls (Blank, 2008). While neoclassical 
economists might argue this incentivizes moral hazard, other social scientists believe that 
individuals and households experiencing poverty are best able to identify this (Blank, 
2008). Until 1993, Gallup polls asked individuals and households in the U.S. to report on 
a subjective poverty threshold; the results showed a close correlation between relative 
and subjective poverty lines (Blank, 2008). In the 1960s, when the official measure was 
developed, the official, relative, and subjective poverty lines are nearly identical (Blank, 





Figure 2-4. Alternate poverty measures in current dollars, 1947–2007 (for a family of four). Reprinted from 
“PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: How to Improve Poverty Measurement in the United States,” by R. Blank, 
2008. 
Subjective poverty lines have been shown to be unbiased measures. A study 
completed in the 1980s comparing subjective poverty lines in the U.S. and Netherlands 
found that the idea of minimally necessary income was relative in both countries (Vos & 
Garner, 1991). In the U.S., other social factors like education had a larger impact on 
determining minimally necessary income (Vos & Garner, 1991). In both countries, 
subjective poverty lines were above official ones, however relative to mean incomes, the 
average subjective thresholds for both countries fell in similar ranges (Vos & Garner, 
1991). Dr. Mahar Mangahas has studied subjective poverty thresholds in the Philippines 
since 1985. His work has been analyzed by Dr. Gaurav Datt of the World Bank, who 
concluded that while self-rated poverty rates are higher than the government’s ‘basic 
needs’ poverty line, there was no statistically significant difference between the level that 
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poor and non-poor households rated the poverty threshold (Haughton & Khandker, 
2009). It was found that urban households rated the poverty threshold almost twice the 
level of rural households (Haughton & Khandker, 2009). This information points to the 
conclusion that there is definitively a need for geographic differentiation in poverty 
thresholds, as well as the idea that there exists some social consensus on when material 
deprivation can occur, regardless of income level. The research on subjective poverty 
lines has not shown a statistically significant level of moral hazard whereby individuals 
are ‘incentivized’ to report needing government assistance.  
Recommendations to Improve the U.S. Poverty Threshold 
Given the existing paradigm of poverty measurement in the United States, there is 
room to improve the poverty threshold measure without radically deviating from our 
current procedures. Economist and former Deputy Secretary of Commerce, Dr. Rebecca 
Blank, has put forward several improvements to the measure: 
1) Give a single statistical agency authority over the development of income poverty 
measures (Blank, 2008). The poverty threshold should be computed like all other 
statistics, none of which stem from the Office of the President (Blank, 2008). 
2) Direct this agency to develop a definition of poverty that produces a credible and 
coherent poverty threshold and uses consistent and logical resource measures 
(Blank, 2008). While prior alternatives have altered the resource definition used, 
the thresholds also must be updated to ensure accurate measures (Blank, 2008). 
3) Allow public welfare programs to continue to use the OMB poverty rate for 
eligibility rulings (Blank, 2008). Because of the dependence on these numbers, it 
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is imperative that organizations and individuals do not immediately lose any 
transfers due to recalculation. As a transition to a different measure occurs, 
programs can be expected to transition to differing eligibility measures, but this 
must not drastically and immediately impact public funding (Blank, 2008). 
4) Commission a list of other key measures of economic deprivation beyond income 
poverty (Blank, 2008). Alternative economic deprivation statistics, like health 
insurance, health status, food adequacy or hunger, literacy or educational 
preparedness, labor market access, and neighborhood or housing conditions, can 
expand our understanding and measurement of poverty. 
All of Dr. Blank’s recommendations are relevant, necessary, and would improve our 
measurement and understanding of poverty in the United States. I would add that 
addressing the systemic issues with how poverty is conceptualized and measured is 
necessary to be able to develop a functional and representative poverty measure.  
Eliminating an absolute, non-geographically differentiated measure of poverty is a 
crucial first step to modernizing the U.S. measurement of poverty. A relative measure of 
poverty allows for fluctuations in trends, variations in costs of goods and services, and 
changing definitions of necessary goods over time. Relative measures also reflect the 
changing purchasing power of dollars. While adjustments for CPI account for changes in 
inflation, they do not factor in changing levels of inequality or living standards. 
Implementing a relative poverty measure provides the framework for geographical 
differentiation in the measurement of poverty. Similarly, a subjective measure of poverty 
would address many of the issues that arise with a fixed threshold. Subjective poverty 
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measures reflect levels of inequality, geographic differentiation, and changes in overall 
wealth better than an absolute measure. A subjective poverty threshold also minimizes 
the paternalistic approach taken by academics and politicians in their attempts to name 
and measure poverty. Asking individuals to report their own status gives them a voice in 
the decision whether they consider themselves to be impoverished or not, rather than 
being labeled so by a government agency.  
 Poverty should not be measured from a single threshold based on income. Poverty 
lines are a simplistic evaluation of a complex experience. Thresholds fail to comprehend 
poverty persistence, levels of deprivation, causes of poverty, or social and political 
realities of economic exclusion and marginalization (O’Brien & Pedulla, 2010). The 
official poverty measure should include the SPM and other measures of economic 
deprivation. Additionally, state and federal governments need to take the time to collect 
and analyze data on the determinants, consequences, and experiences of poverty in the 
U.S. Without this investment in a better understanding of poverty, the official 
measurement will continue to be an inaccurate representation of the lived experience.   
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Chapter 4: The Long-Term Impacts of Poverty and Intersection with Marginalized 
Identities 
Individual systems like health care, criminal justice, and education have interacted 
to reinforce poverty and create and maintain areas of concentrated disadvantage. 
Experiences of poverty are linked to long-term negative physical, mental, and behavioral 
health outcomes, overshadowing the impacts of individual choice and behavior. 
Outcomes in education and employment are linked to place, and both the labor market 
and public education systems act to reinforce each other as well. As all of these systems 
interact to reinforce and concentrate poverty and disadvantage, economic and social 
mobility out of poverty becomes increasingly unattainable. This is an analysis of the 
systemic experiences of poverty, particularly for children, that maintain barriers to 
economic mobility and isolate and concentrate disadvantage in certain communities.  
Childhood poverty has long-lasting and devastating impacts on individuals, 
households, and communities. In 2015, Congress directed The National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS) to provide an “evidence-based, nonpartisan 
analysis of the macroeconomic, health, and crime/social costs of child poverty, to study 
current efforts aimed at reducing poverty.” The report found that children who grow up in 
low-income households are more likely to experience maltreatment and material 
hardship, have impaired physical health, see structural changes in brain development, and 
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experience significant mental health issues (Le Menestrel and Duncan, 2019). Later in 
life, childhood poverty has been linked to lower educational attainment, difficulty  
obtaining consistent employment and lack of economic self-sufficiency in adulthood, 
negative long-term health outcomes, and a greater likelihood of risky behaviors, 
delinquency, and criminal behavior in adolescence and adulthood (Le Menestrel and 
Duncan, 2019). The NAS report estimated the total costs of childhood poverty in the 
U.S., including lost earnings, poor health outcomes, and greater risk for criminality, to 
total between $800 billion and $1.1 trillion annually (Le Menestrel and Duncan, 2019).  
Child poverty rates in the United States are higher than in many other countries 
(Simon, 2018). An estimated one in every five children in the U.S. experience poverty 
each year and one out of every three children will live in a poor household for at least one 
year of their childhood (Magnuson and Votruba-Drzal, 2010). The 2018 SPM found that 
almost 14% of all children in the U.S., 10 million in total, were living in households with 
incomes below the poverty threshold (Fox, 2019). In the same year, 3.3% of children 
were identified as living in ‘deep poverty’, with total family income falling below 50% of 
the SPM (Fox, 2019). Using the 2018 OPM, almost 17% of children in the U.S. were 
found to be experiencing poverty while 7% lived in deep poverty (Fox, 2019). There are 
long-lasting individual and social repercussions for the elevated levels of childhood 
poverty seen in the U.S. Childhood poverty is the source of many health, social, and 
educational inequities which later in life transition into barriers to economic mobility. 
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Poverty and Marginalized Identities 
The consequences of growing up in a low-income household are compounded for 
individuals who hold other marginalized identities; class, race, gender, and ability all 
intersect to determine life experiences. While some data in this chapter will focus solely 
on socioeconomic status, it is important to consider the intersection of these other 
identities with poverty and how this may impact lived experiences and exacerbate 
inequities. 
Poverty disproportionately affects non-white individuals and households. The 
poverty rate among Black households is 20%, more than twice that of white households 
(Fox, 2019). Median Black household wealth in the U.S. is just one-tenth of what white 
households have, a statistic that has held constant over the last 50 years (The Economist, 
2019). 22% of Latinx individuals in the U.S. live in poverty, and for Native and 
Indigenous Americans, the poverty rate on reservations is estimated at 52% overall and 
60% for children (The Economist, 2019). Non-white individuals in the U.S. are over-
represented in poverty statistics across the board.  
 Racialized and gendered components of social welfare programs appear across the 
country. States with the largest Black populations or the largest number of Black 
households receiving welfare will have more restrictive rules, less generous welfare 
benefits, and poorer support services than states with larger white populations (Rodgers 
and Payne, 2007). Several studies have confirmed these findings, showing that states with 
the toughest welfare policies tend to have larger percentages of nonwhite individuals 
receiving AFDC or TANF (Rodgers and Payne, 2007). Research also determined a link 
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between states with a larger proportion of non-white TANF caseloads and having 
stronger sanctions, shorter time limits, and work requirements on social transfers 
(Rodgers and Payne, 2007). School districts are becoming increasingly racially and 
economically segregated due to intentional gerrymandering and neighborhood economic 
effects (Rodgers and Payne, 2007). Teen mothers, children born to unwed partners, and 
single-parent families are all at a higher risk for poverty, disproportionately impacting 
women (Rodgers and Payne, 2007). The child poverty rate among all two-parent 
households is 8%, this number jumps to 39% for single-mother households (Fox, 2019). 
As compared to white women, rates of single motherhood nearly double and just under 
double for Black and Latinx women (Fox, 2019). The risks and experiences of poverty 
are only compounded for those individuals holding multiple marginalized identities. 
Poverty, Health, and Well-Being 
Access to Reproductive Care 
 Poverty rates are particularly high among households headed by single women, 
and childbirth is often the event preceding these households’ poverty spells (Browne & 
LaLumia, 2014). A 2015 Brookings report found that women experiencing poverty are 
more than five times as likely as wealthier women to have an unintended birth (Reeves & 
Venator, 2015). Though rates of sexual activity are comparable for all women, low-
income women are reportedly less likely to use contraception as well as access abortions 
once pregnant (Reeves & Venator, 2015). Young women living in poverty are also more 
likely to have children in their teens (Kearney & Levine, 2012). Researchers claim one 
reason behind this statistic is that the experience of economic marginalization and 
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inequality can lead young women to choose motherhood as a means of short-term 
satisfaction (Kearney & Levine, 2012). This conclusion comes from data showing that 
low-income teens living in areas of poverty that are surrounded by wealthier communities 
are the population most likely to become teen parents (Kearney & Levine, 2012). 
Access to contraception is a key component of increasing economic mobility. It 
increases educational attainment, labor force participation, career outcomes, long-term 
earnings, and decreases the probability young women will experience poverty (Bernstein 
& Jones, 2019). Having legal access to birth control before the age of 20 significantly 
reduces the probability that a woman will subsequently experience poverty (Browne & 
LaLumia, 2014). The introduction of U.S. family planning programs, between 1964 and 
1973, caused participant household incomes to increase by 2.8% (Bailey, Malkova & 
McLaren, 2018). These families were also 7% less likely to live in poverty and 12% less 
likely to receive public assistance (Bailey et al., 2018). John Donohue and Steven Levitt’s 
research found that legalizing abortion in the 1970s led to decreased crime rates 18 years 
later (Donohue & Levitt, 2019). In a follow-up paper published in 2019, they estimated 
that legalized abortion reduced crime rates by roughly 20% between 1997 and 2014 
(Donohue & Levitt, 2019). Access to legal contraception and reproductive care is 
essential to facilitate economic mobility among young women living in poverty. 
Early Childhood Development 
Income level intimately affects maternal and infant health. Exposure to higher 
levels of stress and pollutants begins in utero for children of mothers experiencing 
poverty (Simon, 2018). Individuals from low-income households experience higher rates 
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of preterm births and infant mortality (Wallace, Mendola, Chen, Hwang & Grantz, 2015). 
Across race and ethnicity, individuals living in high poverty areas, defined as 
neighborhoods with low educational attainment, high rates of unemployment, or low 
proportions of individuals in professional occupations, are at a higher risk for preterm 
births (Messer et al., 2008). Underinvestment in community resources and social 
infrastructure is thought to be a source of the disparities in preterm birth levels, as this 
limits individuals’ access to educational and employment opportunities, material goods, 
and health care (Wallace et al., 2015). Chronic stressors in low-income community 
environments, like crime and unsafe housing conditions, are also thought to negatively 
impact maternal health and preterm birth rates (Wallace et al., 2015).  
Preterm birth can cause significant health problems in the first year of a child’s 
life. It is the leading cause of death for infants of non-Hispanic black mothers, and the 
secondary cause of death for all infants in the U.S. (Messer et al., 2008). Preterm births 
create immediate health concerns and financial burdens for families, and they are also 
associated with significant long-term financial and economic costs. In 2005, researchers 
estimated the total economic cost of preterm births in the U.S., including medical care, 
delivery, early intervention services, special education services, and costs incurred due to 
lost household and labor market productivity, to be $51,600 per preterm birth, or an 
annual total of over $26 billion (Messer et al., 2008). For families who experience 
preterm births, the medical costs for that infant will be ten times what they are for infants 
born to term (Messer et al., 2008).  
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 The first four years of a child’s life see the fastest brain growth, a crucial factor in 
their social, cognitive, and emotional development. The majority of this growth is in gray 
matter, the tissue which allows individuals to process information and execute actions, in 
specific parts of the brain (Hanson, Hair, Shen, Shi, Gilmore, Wolfe & Pollak, 2013). 
Lower gray matter volumes affect cognitive and executive functioning (Hanson et al., 
2013). They hinder the processing and interpretation of sensory information, impacting 
individuals’ ability to learn and successfully function in social environments (Damron, 
2018). MRI brain scans taken over the course of children’s lives have shown the negative 
impact of poverty on brain development; as graphed in Figure 3-1, children from low-
income households are projected to have lower gray matter growth development than 
children from wealthier households (Hanson et al., 2013). These differences in volume 
are associated with higher risks of school and health problems and are linked to the 




Figure 3-1. Total gray matter volume for group by age. Reprinted from “Family Poverty Affects the Rate 
of Human Infant Brain Growth,” by J. Hanson, N. Hair, D. Shen, F. Shi, J. Gilmore, B. Wolfe, S. Pollak, 
2013. 
Experiencing early life stressors (ELS) such as physical abuse, poverty, and 
neglect impacts childhood brain development, specifically in the areas of emotional 
processing and regulation. ELS has been linked to lower hippocampus and amygdala 
volumes in children (Hanson, Nacewicz, Sutterer, Cayo, Schaefer, Rudolph, Shirtcliff, 
Pollak, & Davidson, 2015). Researchers have concluded that differences in the 
development of the amygdala and hippocampus may be one of the underlying causes of 
negative long-term social and behavioral outcomes for children who experienced poverty 
(Hanson et al., 2015). 
Differentials in cognitive stimulation also impact early childhood development. A 
number of social and environmental factors cause young children from low-income 
households to experience less cognitive stimulation on average (Damron, 2018). Limited 
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access to resources like books and computers or smaller areas in which to play all factor 
into this disparity (Damron, 2018). Additionally, children in low-income households may 
have less opportunity to access external learning such as attending library classes or 
summer camps (Damron, 2018). Other studies have indicated that within the home, 
parents in low-income households may speak with their children and to each other less 
frequently (Damron, 2018). All of these factors act to cognitively and developmentally 
disadvantage children from low-income homes who are disproportionately exposed to 
them. These differences factor into long-term social, educational, and economic 
outcomes.  
The Income-Health Relationship 
Physical health inequities manifest across the socioeconomic spectrum. Research 
in the field of health outcomes has identified a positive correlation between 
socioeconomic status and health. Graphed in Figure 3-2 is this income-health relationship 
(Wolfe et al., 2012). Marginal changes in income lead to a correlating significant change 
in health status (Wolfe et al., 2012). The gap in health outcomes, between low-income 
individuals and others, begins prior to birth and increases throughout childhood; at every 
age, low-income individuals are more likely to report poorer health than those with 
higher incomes (Wolfe, 2011). As adults, individuals who experienced childhood poverty 
were found to have worse overall health status and higher mortality rates (Magnuson & 
Votruba-Drzal, 2010). By the time they are 50, individuals who grew up in poverty are 
46% more likely to have asthma, 83% more likely to be diabetic, and 40% more likely to 




Figure 3-2. The income-health relationship. Reprinted from “Biological Consequences of Socioeconomic 
Inequalities” by W. Evans, B. Wolf, and N. Adler, 2012. 
Children’s health outcomes are significantly impacted by household income. 
Children from low-SES households are more likely to be diagnosed with chronic health 
conditions like asthma and diabetes and have delays in hearing, vision, and speech 
(Magnuson & Votruba-Drzal, 2010). Children living in a household with an annual 
income of less than $10,000 are more likely to be reported as being in fair or poor health 
as compared to children in the highest income group (Wolfe et al., 2012). Household 
income level is positively correlated with children missing ten or more days of school in 
a year due to injury or illness, having a physical, behavioral, or emotional condition that 
limits activity, and needing a hospital stay or emergency room visit in the previous 
twelve months (Wolfe et al., 2012).  
Lack of insurance is a barrier to care for a number of low-income households. 
With limited options, high costs, incomplete coverage, and confusion over coverage and 
requirements, health insurance is not easily accessible (Simon, 2018). Low-income 
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families are particularly vulnerable to losing health insurance, almost 70% of the 
population that is uninsured is identified as poor or near-poor (Simon, 2018). Without 
health insurance, individuals are less likely to seek preventative care due to costs. 
Waiting to receive medical care until they or their family members are sick leads to 
costlier procedures and greater risks of negative outcomes (Simon, 2018). Children from 
low-income households are twice as likely as children from higher-income homes not to 
receive health care in a year (Simon, 2018). Class-based health inequities occur across 
the spectrum and impact long-term health outcomes. 
Social, Political, and Environmental Factors of Health 
Health outcomes are determined by more than just access to care and individual 
health behaviors. The environment in which individuals live directly impacts their health. 
Unsafe housing, food insecurity, lead exposure, and proximity to pollution and 
biohazards are some of the factors that low-income individuals are more likely to 
experience (Simon, 2018). Additionally, social and environmental stressors have been 
found to significantly affect health outcomes (Simon, 2018). Household unemployment, 
education level, occupation, income, and assets are all factors in individual health status 
as well (Simon, 2018). 
Individual health behaviors are often shaped by community and environmental 
factors. Low-income households are less likely to engage in regular physical exercise, 
more likely to consume foods with higher levels of fat and sugar, and less likely to have 
access to fresh produce (Wolfe et al., 2012). These individual behaviors are impacted by 
having to work increased or off-hours, living in food deserts, and having financial 
51 
 
restrictions (Wolfe et al., 2012). Low-income communities often have differing access to 
recreational facilities, levels of safety, and food resources than higher-income ones, 
impacting the ability for individuals to maintain conventionally ‘healthy’ lifestyles 
(Wolfe et al., 2012). Stressors felt in low-income households may also cause increased 
tobacco or alcohol use and decrease physical activity (Wolfe et al., 2012).  
Differential exposure to pollutants occurs due to the concentration of low-income 
communities near pollution sources and the increased susceptibility to negative health 
factors. Low-income communities and work environments have been documented to 
differentially expose individuals to environmental hazards like pollutants, toxins, and 
carcinogens (Wolfe et al., 2012). Individuals who are unemployed, have lower incomes, 
and lower education levels are more likely to live in areas with higher exposure to 
particulate pollution (Bell & Ebisu, 2012). Higher levels of pollution and toxins result in 
cheaper homes and less desirable jobs. This forces those with fewer financial options into 
housing and jobs with higher levels of pollution, near factories, airports, or highways 
(Bell & Ebisu, 2012). 
 Individuals and families living in low-income neighborhoods have less access to 
fresh and healthy foods. Low-income neighborhoods have just 75% of the number of 
chain supermarkets in middle-income neighborhoods (Powell, Slater, Mirtcheva, Bao & 
Chaloupka, 2007). The availability of chain supermarkets in Black and Hispanic 
neighborhoods is just 52% and 32% respectively, of the numbers in White neighborhoods 
(Powell et al., 2007). Non-chain supermarkets and grocery stores are more prevalent in 
low-income and non-white neighborhoods (Powell et al., 2007), with low-income zip 
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codes having 30% more convenience stores than middle-income areas (Treuhaft & 
Karpyn, 2010). Even though neighborhoods without supermarkets may have corner 
grocers, the larger chains have greater leverage and economies of scale to bring a wider 
variety of products at cheaper prices (Schneider, 2015). A 2009 study by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture found that 23.5 million people lack access to a supermarket 
within a mile of their home (Treuhaft & Karpyn, 2010). Another analysis found that 20% 
of all rural counties were considered “food desert” counties, where all residents live more 
than 10 miles from a supermarket or superstore (Treuhaft & Karpyn, 2010).  
Grocery stores are not opening in low-income communities. A 2015 Associated 
Press report found that the nation’s top 75 food retailers opened almost 10,300 stores in 
new locations between 2011 and 2015, 2,434 of which were grocery stores (Schneider, 
2015). Removing convenience and ‘dollar stores’ from this count, which generally do not 
sell fresh fruits, vegetables or meat, just 250 of the new supermarkets were in so-called 
food deserts and neighborhoods without stores that offer fresh produce and meats 
(Schneider, 2015).  
As the largest supermarket chains have been slow to build in food deserts, dollar 
stores have multiplied rapidly. Three chains, Dollar General, Family Dollar, and Dollar 
Tree, made up two-thirds of new stores in food deserts (Schneider, 2015). Excluding 
dollar stores and 7-Elevens, just 1.4 million of the more than 18 million people the 
USDA says lived in food deserts in 2010 had a supermarket in 2015 (Schneider, 2015). 
Researchers have argued that access is not the only barrier low-income families face in 
consuming healthy foods. Education and understanding of nutrition play a large role in 
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the differences in the consumption of foods. When the same products and prices available 
to high-income households were made available to low-income communities without any 
sort of education, nutritional inequalities were reduced by only 9% (Allcott, Diamond, 
Dube, Handbury, Rahkovsky, & Schnell, 2019).
Stressors and Stress Response Systems  
Repeated negative emotions and stressors can create brain pathways that affect 
biological functioning and health (Wolfe et al., 2012). Children living in poverty are 
more likely to experience psychosocial and environmental stressors. They are exposed to 
events like family turmoil, early childhood separation, community violence, and 
substandard housing at a higher rate than middle-income children (Wolfe et al., 2012). 
Stressful living conditions and family instability and conflict are more likely to impact 
children living in poverty (Damron, 2018). While lower-SES households are exposed to a 
greater number of stressors in their daily lives, they simultaneously often have fewer 
psychosocial resources (Wolfe et al., 2012). Individuals from lower-income homes are 
also less likely to have as many protective factors such as support systems and control 
mechanisms, which can act to mitigate stressful experiences (Wolfe et al., 2012).  
Stress responses have been shown to impact a number of physiological systems in 
the body. There are two primary systems that regulate stress in the body: the 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis and the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) 
(Wolfe et al., 2012). The activation of both systems increases the production of cortisol 
and leads to higher levels of blood glucose levels, cardiac output, and blood pressure 
(Wolfe et al., 2012). Untreated, this can lead to diabetes and heart disease (Wolfe et al., 
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2012). Studies have found that individuals from lower-SES households are more likely to 
interpret a situation as threatening than their higher-SES counterparts, triggering 
increased and elevated stress responses (Wolfe et al., 2012). The HPA and SNS are 
influenced by emotional regulation systems as well (Wolfe et al., 2012). An individual’s 
experience of lacking control, pessimistic thinking, and heightened threats can influence 
physiological responses (Wolfe et al., 2012). Thus, higher exposure to stressors and 
negative mental processes associated with the experience of poverty can manifest 
themselves physiologically. Multiple studies have found elevated cortisol levels and 
stress hormones among children experiencing poverty, particularly for children with 
prolonged exposure, and increasingly, research is linking higher levels of cortisol in the 
body to lower-SES indicators like educational attainment, income level, occupational 
status as well as composite SES and economic hardship measures (Wolfe et al., 2012).  
 Cardiovascular system biomarkers are impacted by these elevated stress response 
levels. Data shows an inverse relationship between blood pressure and socioeconomic 
status (Wolfe et al., 2012). Childhood poverty is also found to be a predictor for high 
blood pressure in adulthood, even when adult SES is accounted for (Wolfe et al., 2012). 
SES levels have also been observed to negatively correlate to heart rate and heart rate 
variability (Wolfe et al., 2012). For individuals experiencing poverty, the nervous system, 
and cardiovascular functions controlled by the nervous system, are found to be worse at 
recovering from stress exposure (Wolfe et al., 2012). Lipids, metabolic hormones, insulin 
levels, and body weight are all shown to vary along the SES gradient as well (Wolfe et 
al., 2012). These biomarkers factor into metabolic conditions like insulin resistance, 
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diabetes, high blood pressure, high blood lipid levels, and elevated glucose levels (Wolfe 
et al., 2012). Experiences of economic deprivation in childhood and adulthood are linked 
to higher rates of diabetes in adulthood, and a number of the biological risk factors for 
diabetes are found to vary along the SES gradient (Wolfe et al., 2012). 
 Allostatic load (AL) is a measure of the cumulative wear on a number of 
physiological systems that regulate biological responses to stressors. Poverty results in a 
higher allostatic load (Wolfe et al., 2012). AL is found to vary with psychosocial stress 
exposure, including economic stressors (Wolfe et al., 2012). Higher ALs have been 
documented in young children from low-income households who experience 
environmental, residential, and family-social stressors (Wolfe et al., 2012). Further 
studies have shown that the greater the amount of time an individual is exposed to 
poverty in childhood, the higher the predicted allostatic load, and poorer working 
memory performance in adulthood (Wolfe et al., 2012). This is just one way all these risk 
factors combine in childhood to affect outcomes in adulthood. 
Mental Health and Substance Use 
Mental health is impacted by poverty. Parents and teachers generally rate children 
from low-income homes as having more behavioral issues (Magnuson & Votruba-Drzal, 
2010). Exposure to the higher levels of violence in low-income neighborhoods can lead 
to depression, anxiety, and externalizing problem behaviors among youth (Dashiff et al., 
2009). Chronic exposure to poverty increases adolescents’ risks for depression and 
suicidality, substance use, earlier and unsafe sexual activity, and criminality (Dashiff et 
al., 2009).  
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For youth living in poverty, the expectation of adult-level responsibilities can be 
more dramatic and abrupt (Dashiff, DiMicco, Myers, & Sheppard, 2009). In low-income 
households, parents often work long hours and have less flexibility in their work 
schedules, increasing the reliance on children to mature and take on more household 
responsibilities (Dashiff et al., 2009). Studies have shown that adolescents are aware of 
the economic difficulties experienced by their families, which can influence the lack of 
satisfaction they feel with their family or environment (Dashiff et al., 2009). This 
awareness can increase incidences of depression and substance use, and cause feelings of 
helplessness, shame, and inferiority (Dashiff et al., 2009). More indirectly, poverty can 
increase levels of parental stress which can disrupt family systems and lead to 
inconsistent discipline, decreased parental monitoring, unsupportive parenting, harsh 
disciplinary practices, and parent-adolescent conflict (Dashiff et al., 2009).  
Poverty and economic struggles in early childhood are linked to a greater 
likelihood of substance use during the transition to adulthood. Previous research has 
linked substance use among adolescents and young adults to poor self-control and 
stressful family environments (Lee, McClernon, Kollins, Prybol & Fuemmeler, 2013). 
The influence of poverty on childhood development can impact individual self-control 
and executive functioning, making those children more prone to risk-taking and 
substance use (Lee et al., 2013). Parental monitoring and high nurturance decrease 
children’s risk for substance use, both of which are less prevalent in lower-income 
households due to work requirements and high levels of stress (Lee et al., 2013).  
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Individuals from low-income households are at a higher risk for substance abuse 
and are exposed to a greater number of risk factors for substance abuse (Dashiff et al., 
2009). These include lower education levels, abuse and neglect, mental health diagnoses, 
parental substance use, and poverty (Dashiff et al., 2009). Adults with mental health 
needs or substance abuse and dependence report living in poverty more frequently 
(Walker & Druss, 2016). Individuals experiencing poverty have less access to mental 
health resources and are more likely to have negative health outcomes regarding their 
substance use (Dashiff et al., 2009). Dependence on substances also decreased the 
likelihood of employment and economically marginalizes individuals, leading to a greater 
incidence of poverty (Spooner & Hetherington, 2005). Statistics from the CDC show that 
in 2011, the rate of overdose deaths from opioid prescription drugs was highest in states 
with elevated poverty levels (CDC, 2016). 
Case Study: Asthma 
Asthma as a single, chronic health condition exemplifies how socioeconomic 
inequities manifest in physical health disparities. Asthma diagnoses and morbidities are 
concentrated in children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds; with children from 
low-SES households twice as likely to be hospitalized for their asthma than higher-SES 
children (Wolfe et al., 2012). Children experiencing poverty are at a higher risk of having 
asthma symptoms, more severe asthma episodes, and being hospitalized for their asthma 
(Wolfe et al., 2012). These statistics apply to communities as well, with lower-income 
and higher-unemployment neighborhoods experiencing higher rates of pediatric asthma 
hospitalizations (Wolfe et al., 2012).  
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Disparities in asthma symptoms and morbidities have been linked to differences 
in biological pathways, social development, psychological stress, environmental factors, 
family dynamics, and physical exposures. Children from low-SES households who have 
been diagnosed with asthma were found to have higher white blood cell counts than their 
higher-SES counterparts, elevating the immune responses in those children (Wolfe et al., 
2012). Asthma attacks are also linked to experiencing psychological distress. Stressful 
life events can elevate the risk for an asthma attack, and research shows that individuals 
from lower SES households are more likely to experience intense reactions to asthma that 
more often require hospitalization (Wolfe et al., 2012). Daily stress is linked to poorer 
lung functioning and increased asthma symptoms in asthmatics (Wolfe et al., 2012). 
Providers studying this disparity noted that feeling threatened can increase the intensity 
of an asthma response (Wolfe, 2011). In order to study this link, researchers showed 
children a video of an ambiguous social situation that could be interpreted in a 
threatening or non-threatening way; children with lower SES were significantly more 
likely to interpret the scenario as threatening (Wolfe, 2011). 
 In families and communities, parental stress generates certain habits and 
behaviors that can act as a predictor of asthma diagnosis in children (Wolfe et al., 2012). 
For asthmatic children, family dysfunction can increase rates of morbidity and mortality 
(Wolfe et al., 2012). Parental stress is shown to correlate to a higher risk of children 
developing wheezing in the first two years of their life, increased asthma symptoms, and 
a higher likelihood of asthma hospitalizations (Wolfe et al., 2012). Asthmatic children in 
low-income households are more likely to have smokers in their homes, which can 
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exacerbate asthma symptoms (Wolfe et al., 2012). Researchers have found that greater 
exposure to violence in a neighborhood is linked to an increased number of symptom 
days for children with asthma (Wolfe et al., 2012). High rates of drug and gang-related 
crime in a neighborhood have been similarly linked to increased asthma symptoms in 
children (Wolfe et al., 2012). This is likely due to the higher stress responses of children 
from low-income neighborhoods and the increased number of stressors they experience 
through exposure to violence.  
Asthmatic children living in poverty are exposed to a number of environmental 
risks. Living in a low-income household elevates sensitivity and exposure to allergens 
like cockroaches (Wolfe et al., 2012). These increased rates of sensitivity and exposure 
were shown to put children at a higher risk for hospitalization, unplanned medical visits 
for asthma, and more asthma symptoms after one year (Wolfe et al., 2012). Exposure to 
nitrogen dioxide is a factor in respiratory morbidity, and children with asthma who live in 
multi-family houses are exposed to higher rates of nitrogen dioxide than those living in 
single-family homes (Wolfe et al., 2012). Asthma is a case example of how health 
outcomes are determined by the interaction of physical, social, and environmental 
experiences for children experiencing poverty.  
Poverty, Education, and Employment 
Public Education Systems 
Experiences with public schools in the U.S. vary broadly based on districting and 
surrounding communities. A majority of public-school students come from low-income 
families, as they are more limited in their ability to attend private or charter schools 
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(Jordan, 2015). As shown in Figure 3-3, the rate of low-income public-school students is 
concentrated in certain counties. Students from low-income households are six times as 
likely to attend high-poverty high schools, where 75% or more of the student body 
qualifies for free and reduced lunch (Jordan, 2015). Public schools in these areas with 
high concentrations of poverty disproportionately serve students of color, have higher 
dropout rates, and have lower graduation and enrollment rates (Kearney & Levine, 2016). 
High-poverty public schools in areas of concentrated disadvantage face a number of 
barriers in their students’ success and overall have more negative long-term educational 
outcomes.  
 
Figure 3-3. Share of children from low-income families in public schools. Reprinted from “A closer look at 
income and race concentration in public schools” by R. Jordan, 2015. 
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Public-school funding is directly tied to the property values of homes and 
businesses surrounding a school district. As seen in Figure 3-4, this leads to dramatically 
different levels of per-pupil spending across districts and states. A 2013 study found that 
per-pupil public school spending varied drastically over short distances. Just outside of 
Chicago, districts an hour apart were spending an annual $9,794 and $28,639 per pupil 
respectively (Turner, Khrais, Lloyd, Olgin, Isensee, Vevea, & Carsen, 2016). At the same 
time, the national average for annual per-pupil spending was $11,841 (Turner et al., 
2016). This stark difference in spending is precipitated by the success or failure of the 
businesses that neighbor school districts, and the associated taxed income. School 
districts in communities that have been historically segregated by wealth and receive less 
in business and property taxes, will receive less funding (Turner et al., 2016). Properties 
and businesses are assessed at higher values in wealthier neighborhoods and pay higher 
property taxes, thereby generating more funding for the surrounding school district. This 




Figure 3-4. Spending per Student, by School District. Reprinted from “Why America's Schools Have A 
Money Problem,” by C. Turner, R. Khrais, T. Lloyd, A. Olgin, L. Isensee, B. Vevea, D. Carsen, 2016. 
While state taxes are often redistributed towards poorer school districts, the gap in 
funding remains (Turner et al., 2016). The breakdown of public-school funding sources 
can vary significantly across states and districts. In 2016, Illinois public-schools received 
8% of their funding from the federal government, 24% from the state, and 67% from 
local taxes (NCES, 2019). In the same year, Vermont public-schools received 7% of their 
funding at the federal level, 89% from the state, and 4% from local taxes (NCES, 2019). 
States with higher property taxes and overall higher-value homes and businesses will 
need less support from state and federal governments.  
In systematically underfunded public-school districts, schools deal with broken 
and condemned buildings, limited resources, staffing issues, under-certified instructors, 
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and schools unable to open five days a week (Turner et al., 2016). Underfunded schools 
often share staff like art and music teachers, nurses, counselors, and social workers across 
schools and districts (Turner et al., 2016). Schools with lower budgets will have increased 
student to staff ratios, making for less control in the classroom and higher burnout rates 
among teachers (Turner et al., 2016). Funding in higher-income neighborhoods allows 
schools to take steps to individualize learning for students, pay teachers higher salaries, 
and ensure healthy school lunches every day, options public schools in lower-income 
districts do not have (Turner et al., 2016).  
In addition to limited funding, students living in low-income areas tend to have 
higher needs than their wealthier counterparts; as one teacher is quoted “kids can’t check 
their poverty at the classroom door” (Turner et al., 2016). Providers and teachers in 
lower-income school districts are working with students with chronic hunger, health 
problems, behavioral issues, and higher emotional needs while receiving significantly 
less funding to do so (Turner et al., 2016). Addressing behavioral needs alongside 
educational ones is important. A study from Northwestern found that supporting positive 
social-emotional skills in youth can support a student’s long-term success (Turner et al., 
2016). Their research showed that working with students to develop social skills like 
sharing, cooperation, and perseverance meant students were less likely to experience 
poverty as adults, increased the likelihood students would graduate high school, and saw 
a 10% increase in adult earnings for low-income students (Jackson, Johnson, and Persico, 
2015). Academics are not the sole factor in long-term successful outcomes students, and 
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schools with limited funding often find themselves cutting social and behavioral 
resources.  
Educational Attainment, Employment, and Long-Term Income 
Household income is one of the strongest predictors of student achievement. As 
the gap in incomes between high- and low-SES families increases, so does the gap in 
academic achievement. For children born in 2001, the achievement gap between low and 
high-SES students is around 40% greater than for those individuals born in 1975 and 75% 
larger than gaps for students born in the 1940s (Reardon, 2012). Within this gradient, 
income achievement gaps also increased between white students and students of color 
(Reardon, 2012). Educational achievement and cognitive skills have become an 
increasingly strong predictor of adult income levels (Reardon, 2012).  
Lack of access to higher education acts as a barrier for students from low-income 
families in their ability to move upwards. Students from low-income households are less 
likely to enroll in college (Mayer, 2010) and are one third as likely to attend graduate 
programs (Magnuson & Votruba-Drzal, 2010). Studies have shown that even incremental 
changes in parental income will significantly impact the estimated level of educational 
attainment for children; a 10% increase in parental income is associated with a .024 to 
.104 change in additional years of school for children (Mayer, 2010). Higher education 
places a significant financial burden on low-income families. These families are not as 
likely as higher-income households to have access to resources and credit necessary to 
fund a college education (Mayer, 2010). With acceptance and funding to many 
institutions based on merit, wealthier families are advantaged with access to tutors and 
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other resources to assist their children. As previously discussed, there can also be 
cognitive and developmental differences in children based on socioeconomic status 
which may affect the ‘merit’ colleges assess students as having when handing out 
acceptance letters and scholarships (Mayer, 2010). 
Areas of Concentrated Disadvantage 
Poverty has remained concentrated in certain areas of the country rather than 
being distributed equally throughout, leading to areas of concentrated disadvantage, and 
economic and racial segregation. Figure 3-5 shows theses counties where poverty has 
remained concentrated. Research found that in 2016, there was “no metropolitan region 
in the nation where a low-income person was more likely to live in an economically 
expanding neighborhood than an economically declining neighborhood” (Meade, 2014). 
Families living in areas of concentrated poverty experience diminished school quality and 
academic achievement, poor health and healthcare quality, reduced employment levels, 
higher rates of crime, devalued properties, and obstacles to wealth building and economic 
mobility (Meade, 2014). While areas of concentrated disadvantage experience significant 
social issues, they are also more likely to be located further away from social services and 
resources that can assist with or alleviate these problems (Meade, 2014). These outcomes 
extend to both poor and non-poor residents of disadvantaged communities, pointing to 
the surrounding environment in which individuals live as a defining factor in their long-




Figure 3-5. Poverty Rate of the Total Population by County: 2018. Reprinted from “Small Area Income 
and Poverty Estimates: 2018,” by S. Elser, R. Upton, C. Gann, 2020. 
Concentrated Poverty and Disadvantage 
Areas of concentrated poverty are generally defined as Census tracts in which 
40% of the population lives below the federal poverty line. Census tracts are based on 
population sizes while Zip Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) represent service delivery 
areas and depend on the population density of an area. A 2014 research brief for the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services uses both census tracts and ZCTAs to define 
concentrated poverty. For the report, ZCTAs were defined as areas of concentrated 
poverty through two measures: 1) if they contained a Census tract where the official 
poverty rate is greater than 40% and 2) the Census tract with the poverty rate of 40% or 
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more was located in a ZCTA where 30% of residents were identified as poor (Meade, 
2014). Using these definitions, 690 ZCTAs were determined to be areas of concentrated 
poverty (Meade, 2014). Half of all of the U.S. Census tracts with poverty rates above 
40% were located within these ZCTAs (Meade, 2014). Given this data, in 2016, an 
estimated 12.8 million individuals, or 4% of the U.S. population, were living in areas of 
concentrated poverty (Meade, 2014). Within these 30/40 ZCTAs, the overall poverty rate 
was 35% while the child poverty rate was almost 52% (Meade, 2014). Figure 3-6 shows 
neighborhoods where poor populations are most likely to live in high poverty areas. 
Areas of concentrated poverty are not distributed evenly across the country and are 
overrepresented by inner-city and urban neighborhoods, tribal reservations, and many 
isolated and rural regions (Meade, 2014).  
 
Figure 3-6. Share of Poor Living in Neighborhoods with Poverty Rates of 40% or Higher. Reprinted from 
“The Growth and Spread of Concentrated Poverty, 2000 to 2008-2012,” by E. Kneebone, 2014. 
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Non-white populations are significantly overrepresented in areas of concentrated 
poverty. While under a third of the total U.S. population is Black or Latinx, four out of 
every five individuals living in metropolitan areas of concentrated disadvantage are Black 
or Latinx (Meade, 2014). Black individuals make up 12% of the total U.S. population and 
20% of the population considered to be experiencing poverty, yet almost 40% of 
individuals residing in areas of concentrated poverty are Black (Meade, 2014). Similarly, 
Latinx individuals account for 16% of the total population and 23% of the population 
experiencing poverty, while 40% of the individuals living in areas of concentrated 
poverty are Latinx (Meade, 2014). Areas of concentrated poverty tend to experience high 
rates of racial segregation. 46% of areas of concentrated poverty are majority Black and 
32% majority Latinx, with just 14% of areas of concentrated poverty having no single 
racial or ethnic group that constitutes a majority of the residents (Meade, 2014).  
Areas of concentrated poverty see elevated teen and overall birth rates. A ninth of 
the teen births in the U.S. occur in metropolitan areas of concentrated poverty; the teen 
birth rate in 30/40 ZCTAs is 2.25 times greater than the national rate (Meade, 2014). 53 
of the 30/40 ZCTAs had teen birth rates five times the national rate, and pregnancy rates 
among the entire child-bearing population twice the national rate (Meade, 2014). 
Children living in metropolitan areas of concentrated poverty are twice as likely to be 
raised by a single mother, and more than 8% of all the single mother households with 
children in the U.S. are located within areas of concentrated poverty (Meade, 2014). 
Economic outcomes are affected by areas of concentrated poverty. In an average 
30/40 ZCTA, just 45 % of the working-age population was employed (Meade, 2014). 
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Nationally, male and female unemployment were 8.3% and 7.6% respectively, while in 
30/40 ZCTAs average male and female unemployment was 17.3% and 15.6% (Meade, 
2014). The average household median income in an area of concentrated poverty was 
$24,800 at the time, less than half of the national median income level (Meade, 2014). 
Adults from these ZCTAs were twice as likely to not graduate from high school and three 
times less likely to have a bachelor’s degree as compared to average individuals in the 
U.S.; just above one in 10 adults living in areas of concentrated poverty had earned a 
bachelor’s degree (Meade, 2014).  
Concentrated disadvantage is a life course indicator that was developed to better 
measure community health. The measure uses poverty rates, public assistance use, 
number of female-headed households, unemployment rates, and size of the population to 
determine whether communities can be defined as such. Areas of concentrated 
disadvantaged are associated with poor birth outcomes, poor educational outcomes, 
higher rates of child maltreatment, teen pregnancies, violent crime, and lack of access to 
healthy foods and recreational facilities and areas (UHF, 2020). Mapped in Figure 3-7, in 
2019, 24% of all U.S. households were located in areas of concentrated disadvantage 




Figure 3-7. Percentage of households located in census tracts with a high level of concentrated 
disadvantage. From “National Concentrated Disadvantage”, by the United Health Foundation, 2019. 
Economic Mobility 
Childhood poverty, particularly when deep or persistent, increases the likelihood 
that a child will experience adult poverty; what is termed the “intergenerational 
transmission of economic disadvantage” (Magnuson & Votruba-Drzal, 2010). Raj Chetty 
and Nathaniel Hendren’s work on intergenerational mobility has shown the long-term 
impact childhood poverty has. Using tax records for individuals born in the 1980s, they 
showed that the neighborhood children grow up in can affect income level, college 
attendance rates, fertility, and marriage patterns (Chetty & Hendren, 2017). Their work 
showed that neighborhoods impact intergenerational mobility primarily through exposure 
during childhood.  
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Chetty and Hendren found that for every year a child spends in a neighborhood 
with certain positive outcomes, the child’s long-term outcomes improve in proportion to 
the length of time spent in that area at a rate of 4 % per year of exposure (Chetty & 
Hendren, 2017). Expected long-term incomes for children who move to a higher income 
neighborhood will rise to the average income level of permanent residents of that 
neighborhood at a rate of 4% per year of exposure during childhood while moving to a 
neighborhood with lower income levels will reduce children’s expected adult income 
levels by the same rate of 4% per year of exposure (Chetty & Hendren, 2017). Children 
who move at birth will thus absorb 80% of the neighborhood exposure effect into their 
long-term income levels (Chetty & Hendren, 2017). Chetty et al. found that for those 
children who moved to multiple neighborhoods throughout their childhood, their 
outcomes varied proportionally to the amount of time spent in each neighborhood, with 
the age of the child during each move proving not to be significant (Chetty & Hendren, 
2017). They determined that neighborhood exposure effects remained linear with age 
having no differing impact on children of different ages, meaning there is no critical age 
after which the economic returns to moving to a higher-income neighborhood fall (Chetty 
& Hendren, 2017). Their work also found similar childhood exposure effects on a 
number of other outcomes like rates of college attendance, marriage, and teen pregnancy 
(Chetty & Hendren, 2017). 
Chetty and Hendren conclude that for long-term outcomes, place always matters. 
In later publications Chetty et al. (2018) highlight three key lessons from the research: 
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1. Differing outcomes across neighborhoods is due to the causal effects of locations 
and is not a reflection of the characteristics of the residents.  
2. Neighborhood conditions that lead to productive labor markets are not the same as 
those that create greater upward mobility. 
3. Every year of childhood exposure is equally impactful.  
Economic mobility and opportunity are shaped by childhood environments and 
experiences. These exposure effects compound annually, increasing long-term income 
estimates for each year a child spends in an area with higher permanent resident incomes.  
When looking at the data through the lens of gender, Chetty and Hendren (2016) 
found that the traditional gender gap in employment rates is reversed for those children 
growing up in the bottom fifth of income distribution; boys are less likely to work than 
girls (Chetty & Hendren, 2016). The largest degree of variation in outcomes across place 
occurs for boys growing up in poor, single-parent households (Chetty & Hendren, 2016). 
Chetty and Hendren (2016) found that areas with high levels of poverty and significant 
non-white populations also had high rates of crime, and they imply that the reason for 
men having lower employment rates may be that crime acts as a substitute for formal 
employment in areas of concentrated poverty (Chetty & Hendren, 2016).  
Chetty and others have since expanded on their work, to look at the intersections 
of race and economic opportunity in the United States. They found that among Black 
Americans and American Indians, upward mobility rates decrease and downward 
mobility rates increase in comparison to white individuals, controlling for parental 
marital status, education, and wealth, finding the Black-white income gap to be 
73 
 
conditional on parental income level (Chetty, Hendren, Jones & Porter, 2018). These 
trends are what lead to significant and persistent racial disparities seen across 
generations. Researchers found that when controlling for parental income level, in 99% 
of census tracts, Black boys were found to have lower incomes in adulthood than their 
white counterparts (Chetty et al., 2018). Chetty and fellow researchers used this data to 
construct The Opportunity Atlas; a public atlas looking at children’s long-term income 
levels based on their parent’s income level and the neighborhoods in which they grew up 
in, shown in Figure 3-8. The atlas exemplifies how neighborhoods significantly impact 
economic mobility for children of low-income parents.  
Cities on the lower end of the economic mobility spectrum are characterized by 
high levels of economic and racial segregation, poorly performing schools, high crime 
rates, and low levels of social capital (Badger, 2015). Many low-mobility areas as defined 
by the atlas, particularly in the deep South, have historically large Black populations 
(HUD, 2014). A significant portion of the rural areas with low mobility scores house 
reservations and large Native American and American Indian populations (HUD, 2014). 
The bottom ten regions with the lowest mobility scores include the Sioux reservation in 
South Dakota, the Navajo, Hopi, and Apache reservations in Arizona, and areas in Alaska 




Figure 3-8. 2014 Adult Household Incomes of Children Who Lived in Low-Income Households in 1986. 




Chapter 5: Social Institutions and Poverty in the United States 
Social, political, and economic institutions in the United States have developed 
around and are even dependent upon the current system of poverty. Specifically looking 
at the welfare system, mass incarceration, and capitalism, these systems interact and 
overlap to limit the effectiveness of anti-poverty measures. Policymaking is often limited 
by the larger economic system and similarly, mass incarceration has led to enormous 
profit and has become predicated on an army of impoverished, reserved laborers. The 
welfare system in the U.S. has become increasingly less effective over time. What began 
as an initiative to address poverty as a collective social issue, has transitioned into a 
system focused on altering individual ‘maladaptive’ behaviors. This ideal that has been 
reflected in policy priorities across administrations and resulted in an underfunded, 
ineffective social safety net. As gaps in the welfare system have expanded, mass 
incarceration has stepped in as a government intervention to manage the individuals who 
are left out of the welfare system and the economy. Finally, the capitalist mode of 
production in the U.S. is predicated on the existence of poverty and inequality and has 
become in intricately tied to the system of mass incarceration. All of these systems act to 




Poverty Alleviation and the United States Welfare System 
Anti-Poverty Measures in the United States 
In 1962, Michael Harrington wrote The Other America, a detailed study of 
poverty in the U.S., often credited with inciting Johnson’s War on Poverty. In his work, 
he found that the most vulnerable age group at the time were the elderly, with 50% 
existing below minimum living standards (Harrington, 1962). Using targeted policies like 
Medicare, SSI, and Social Security, the incidence of poverty among elderly individuals in 
the U.S. dropped significantly. The treatment of the elderly poor shows the impact that 
well-funded, targeted anti-poverty government interventions can have. There is the 
capacity to significantly reduce poverty in the U.S., however, policies have had to work 
against systemic barriers, fiscal conservatives, and stigma against the poor. 
As seen in Figure 4-1, the 2018 Supplemental Poverty Measure gives us an idea 
of how effective current anti-poverty measures are in the U.S., showing how many 
individuals are lifted out of or placed into poverty each year due to anti-poverty programs 
and necessary expenses. According to the SPM, 48% of elderly individuals would be 
considered poor with no government intervention, yet after taxes and transfers, that 
number is reduced to 14% (Fox, 2019). Social Security continues to be the most 
impactful program for alleviating poverty, lifting 27.2 million individuals above the 
official poverty threshold in 2018 (Fox, 2019). Refundable tax credits like the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Child Tax Credit (CTC) facilitated 8.9 million 
individuals being brought above the official poverty threshold (Fox, 2019). On the other 
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side, medical expenses were the largest contributing factor for individuals falling below 
the poverty threshold, with 8 million individuals being impacted (Fox, 2019).  
 
Figure 4-1. Change in Number of People in Poverty after Including Each Element: 2018. Reprinted from 
“The Supplemental Poverty Measure: 2018” by L. Fox, 2019.  
A Columbia University study estimated that without modern social safety net 
programs, 29% of all individuals in the U.S. would fall below the poverty line (Boteach, 
Stegman, Baron, Ross & Wright, 2014). Studying poverty trends using an anchored SPM, 
research shows while the OPM has shown no significant decline in the number of 
individuals experiencing poverty since 1964, the SPM has shown that safety nets have 
reduced instances of poverty from 26% in 1967 to 16% in 2012 (Fox, Wimer, Garfinkel, 
Kaushal & Waldfogel, 2015). Additionally, during the 2008 economic downturn, the 
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poverty rate did not increase because the government expanded social safety programs 
(Fox et al., 2015). Looking at previous economic recessions, without the increased 
funding put towards these welfare programs, poverty rates would have risen an estimated 
5%-6% (Fox et al., 2015). Social safety nets have the capacity to protect individuals from 
falling below the poverty line and are key in reducing or maintaining low poverty rates.  
Efforts to address poverty in the United States began in the 1960s with the 
Johnson administration’s War on Poverty. During his 1964 State of the Union address, 
President Johnson cited widespread poverty and shortfalls in basic human rights around 
the country. At the time of his speech, around 20% of families in the country were 
classified as living in poverty which meant an annual pre-tax cash income of less than 
$3,000; more than a million of these families had four or more children (Haveman, 
Blank, Moffitt, Smeeding & Wallace, 2015). Prior to 1964, families had access to 
government cash-assistance through Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
(Haveman et al., 2015). AFDC was only available to low-income, single-mother families. 
While the initial focus of War on Poverty programs was to provide families with cash 
income support, that mindset shifted in the 80s and 90s, with programs switching to 
provide in-kind benefits that incentivized work and labor-force participation (Haveman et 
al., 2015).  
During the 1960s, the Johnson administration passed the Economic Opportunity 
Act, alongside a number of other reforms, through the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO). These programs were focused on providing direct services to those experiencing 
poverty, promoting human capital development among low-income communities, and 
79 
 
destigmatizing poverty (Haveman et al., 2015). The administration oversaw the 
implementation of the Legal Services Program, OEO neighborhood health centers, job 
training programs, Head Start, Community Action Program (CAP), Medicaid and 
Medicare, AFDC, community development, educational programs, and the expansion of 
food stamps and subsidized housing (Haveman et al., 2015). In 1965, the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act was passed, establishing the Title I program to subsidize school 
districts with large low-income student populations (Haveman et al., 2015). Richard 
Nixon took office in 1969 and expanded on the anti-poverty measures of the previous 
administration. The OEO focused on providing targeted benefits for poor families that 
promoted welfare rights and access to public support (Haveman et al., 2015). Under the 
Nixon administration, benefits to individuals with disabilities and the elderly were 
expanded, with a 20% increase in Social Security benefits and the introduction of 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) (Haveman et al., 2015).  
The trend of emphasizing work incentives in social welfare policies began under 
Nixon. In 1967, his administration implemented the 30-and-a-third legislation which 
increased AFDC earnings deductions, a move meant to reduce work disincentives and 
expand eligibility. The Nixon administration was also responsible for a number of studies 
examining work disincentives associated with income support programs (Haveman et al., 
2015). The studies, which measured the impacts of income support on factors like 
children’s well-being and parent’s educational attainment, reportedly failed to find that 
the social benefits outweighed the financial costs (Haveman et al., 2015). Human capital 
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and community development programs were characterized as particularly inefficient, 
laying the groundwork for future rollbacks in these programs (Haveman et al., 2015). 
From 1965 to 1972, public spending on the War on Poverty and Great Society 
programs increased from $45 billion to $149 billion, using 2014 dollars (Haveman et al., 
2015). Due to this spending, by the mid-1970s poverty rates had fallen drastically, with 
rates dropping below 10% for the first time (Haveman et al., 2015). The labor market was 
booming and economic growth positively impacted workers across the spectrum; 
academics and politicians alike saw an end to poverty and material deprivation in the 
country within the decade (Haveman et al., 2015). In just seven years, poverty rates had 
decreased overall by 3.7% and 7% among targeted groups (Haveman et al., 2015).  
Stagflation during the early 1970s heavily impacted anti-poverty policies. As the 
job market deteriorated and economic growth slowed, benefit cuts began to occur as 
program caseloads increased beyond initial capacities. In 1973, the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act (CETA) was passed, which provided block grants to states 
to help unemployed, underemployed, and disadvantaged individuals receive job training 
based on federal guidelines (Haveman et al., 2015) The legislation was controversial for 
its provision of federally subsidized public service employment (Haveman et al., 2015). 
During this era of stagflation and low economic growth, unemployment rates among low-
skilled workers increased and the bottom half of all workers saw a reduction in income 
(Haveman et al., 2015). At the same time, technological advances increased the demand 
for higher-skilled workers and college premiums began to rise (Haveman et al., 2015).  
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 Both the Earned Income Tax Credit and Food Stamps were introduced during the 
1970s. In 1975, the EITC was implemented as a small work incentive program with a 
refundable earnings-related tax credit. The New Jobs Tax Credit of 1977-79 also 
subsidized the creation of jobs for low-wage workers (Haveman et al., 2015). Both tax 
credits emphasized work incentives over entitlement. In 1979, the Food Stamp purchase 
requirement was lifted. Previously, Food Stamps were only accessible as a coupon 
program which required individuals to first purchase them. In 1967, just 5 of the 19 
million households eligible for Food Stamps were able to access them (Boteach et al., 
2014). By 1974, with the purchase requirement lifted, this number tripled to 15 million 
(Haveman et al., 2015). 
Throughout the 1970s and 80s, instances of single-parent households, divorce 
rates, and the number of women entering the labor force all increased (Haveman et al., 
2015). AFDC budgets saw a rapid expansion due to these changes, with just 8% of 
households led by women in the 1960s jumping to 17% in the 80s and 23% in 2013 
(Haveman et al., 2015). From 1970 to 1990, women’s labor force participation rate shot 
up 14.2% (Haveman et al., 2015). Women and mothers’ roles in the formal labor 
economy shifted, increasing caseload numbers and allocating increased funding to social 
welfare programs.  
 Political backlash from stagflation and a low-performing economy led to the 
election of fiscal conservative Ronald Reagan in 1980. The Reagan administration’s top 
priority was to halt inflation in the economy, and financial priorities shifted away from 
social welfare programs (Haveman et al., 2015). Reagan’s economic policies were 
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defined by a number of substantial tax cuts skewed towards higher-income households. 
This approach, known as trickle-down economics, led to a significant federal budget 
deficit (Haveman et al., 2015). The administration also allowed states to alter AFDC 
programs and increase work requirements (Haveman et al., 2015). Cuts to social 
spending were framed as an economic stimulus that would reduce poverty through 
increased corporate spending. CETA was replaced by the Job Training Partnership Act of 
1982, establishing federal assistance programs to train youth and adults for private sector 
employment (Haveman et al., 2015). At the same time, the federal EITC and Food 
Stamps programs were expanded (Haveman et al., 2015). From 1975 to 1985, social 
benefits as a percentage of personal income increased by just 1% (Haveman et al., 2015). 
 The demographics of populations experiencing poverty drew stigma and drove 
policy changes in the federal government. A highlighted narrative of single-mother 
families and non-white, inner-city poverty allowed politicians to prioritize behavioral 
changes of individuals receiving welfare in their policymaking. It was argued repeatedly 
by conservative economists that income supports disincentivized work among individuals 
receiving them. In response to these concerns, the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988 was 
passed, altering the structure of the AFDC program to emphasize work, child support, 
and family benefits (Haveman et al., 2015). The FSA allowed for child support to be 
automatically withheld from paychecks and required teen mothers receiving public 
assistance to be in school and in some circumstances, to live with their parents (Haveman 
et al., 2015). Another piece of the FSA, the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training 
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program required individuals to be working to receive TANF benefits (Haveman et al., 
2015).  
 Some of the greatest shifts in welfare reform occurred during the 1990s under the 
Clinton administration. At the time, the goal of social safety net programs shifted away 
from alleviating poverty and towards reducing dependence on welfare. Research had 
shown that previous expansions of the EITC significantly and positively impacted 
employment among single mothers, and it was expanded once again in 1993 (Haveman et 
al., 2015). The expansion of the EITC proved to be more effective at increasing 
employment levels than any macro-level economic growth. At the same time, labor 
market growth was increasingly skewed towards higher-educated workers while 
employment opportunities and wages for low-skilled workers were diminishing 
(Haveman et al., 2015). 
The Clinton administration was responsible for increasing child-care subsidies 
and early childhood education programs to assist single mothers’ transition into the 
workforce. They passed the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in 1997, the 
largest expansion of taxpayer-funded health insurance for children since the 
establishment of Medicaid itself (Haveman et al., 2015). CHIP is a federal program that 
matches state funding for health insurance for families with children who do not qualify 
for Medicaid and cannot afford other health insurance. Today, CHIP provides coverage 
for 8 million children in the U.S. (Haveman et al., 2015).  
After more than ten years of conservative administrations under Reagan and 
Bush, Democrats began to run for office taking a much harder line on both welfare and 
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crime. The result was Bill Clinton’s election and subsequent passage of two welfare and 
crime bills that resulted in disastrous consequences for poor communities of color. The 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) 
was enacted under the Clinton administration, “changing welfare as we knew it”. The 
FSA was considered to have failed to properly incentivize work among welfare recipients 
(Haveman et al., 2015). Additionally, there had been insufficient improvement in labor 
market outcomes associated with the FSA’s focus on building human capital (Haveman 
et al., 2015). Under PRWORA, individuals were no longer entitled to receive AFDC 
benefits. Instead, AFDC funds shifted to the form of block grants to states with the name 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) (Haveman et al., 2015). Under 
TANF, individuals are required to start working at least two years after they begin 
receiving benefits, and recipients of the federal TANF funding are limited to five total 
years of lifetime eligibility (Haveman et al., 2015). PRWORA also took steps to 
financially incentivize two-parent households while discouraging births to unmarried 
couples (Haveman et al., 2015).  
The enactment of PRWORA led to welfare caseloads being cut in half, with 5 
million cases in 1993 falling to less than 2.5 million in 2000 (Haveman et al., 2015); 
similar trends were seen in Food Stamp recipient numbers (Blank, 2000). TANF block 
grant funding has not been expanded since its inception, and while some states are 
generous in their use of TANF funds in putting them towards childcare or job training, 
many leave the program underutilized (Haveman et al., 2015). In 2011, less than $10 
billion in TANF welfare benefits were distributed in the states and caseloads remained 
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low at just 2.3 million (Haveman et al., 2015). PRWORA took an additional step to 
freeze funding for Social Security’s AFDC/TANF program at the 1996 level without 
accounting for changes in inflation (Boteach et al., 2014). Due to this freeze, TANF has 
since lost 30% of its real value to inflation and is largely unresponsive to economic 
recessions (Boteach et al., 2014). Figure 4-2 shows how AFDC/TANF benefits have 
declined over time in response to policy changes, with fewer people currently receiving 
TANF than in any year since 1971 (Blank, 2000).  
 
Figure 4-2. Number of families receiving AFDC/TANF benefits for every 100 families with children in 
poverty. Reprinted from “Chart Book: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families” by CBPP, 2019. 
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With the advent of work for welfare, expansions of the EITC, and an expanding 
economy, employment rates rose and poverty rates declined up until the late 1990s 
(Haveman et al., 2015). Even though unemployment rates were declining, the minimum 
wages received for low-skill jobs continued to place individuals, particularly single 
mothers, below the poverty line (Haveman et al., 2015). So, while PRWORA did lower 
unemployment, it did more to reduce TANF caseloads than actually reduce poverty 
levels. Between 1985 and 2000, social benefits as a percentage of personal income 
increased from 11% to 12%, and the welfare system in the U.S. had almost entirely 
transitioned from entitlement to work incentives.  
 The 2000s Bush administration passed several rounds of tax cuts which expanded 
the CTC and SSI. At the same time, they cut existing job training programs and limited 
benefit access for those who were unemployed or had a disability to the Social Security 
Disability Insurance Program (SSDI) (Haveman et al., 2015). Homelessness became an 
increasingly visible problem as access to welfare remained limited (Haveman et al., 
2015).  
During the 2008 recession, the Obama administration was faced with a shrinking 
economy, extensive job loss, and a social safety net system dependent on employment 
(Haveman et al., 2015). In response, the administration passed the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) as well as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The 
ARRA was an $800 billion investment that funded temporary relief programs, income tax 
credits, a payroll tax cut, expansion of the EITC, increased Medicaid spending, Pell 
grants, Head Start and child-care services, and expanded unemployment benefits and 
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Food Stamps (Haveman et al., 2015). Due to this influx of social welfare spending, the 
poverty rate during the recession stayed relatively constant (Haveman et al., 2015).  
The ACA expanded Medicaid benefits, increased funding for Community Health 
Centers, and lowered eligibility requirements for CHIP, which led to a corresponding 5% 
drop-in uninsured rates (Haveman et al., 2015). As the economy began to recover from 
the recession, SSDI saw its caseloads swell as job creation had been focused in low-skill 
and low-wage sectors, which failed to provide individuals with health or pension benefits 
(Haveman et al., 2015). At the same time, the Food Stamps program transitioned into the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). From 2000 to 2016, social benefits 
as a percentage of personal income rose from a total of 12% to 17%, and SNAP, EITC, 
and CTC became the cornerstones of the modern income support system (Haveman et al., 
2015). 
Political and Economic Challenges to Addressing Poverty Rates 
 Apart from ideological differences in policy-making decisions, anti-poverty 
measures have faced a number of economic challenges in their effectiveness. Beginning 
in the 1970s, economic gains became increasingly concentrated towards high-income 
earners, as shown in Figure 4-3, laying the groundwork for the vast inequality in wealth 




Figure 4-3. Widening Inequality in the U.S. since the 1970s. Reprinted from “The War on Poverty: Then 
and Now,” by M. Boteach, E. Stegman, S. Baron, T. Ross & K. Wright, 2014. 
Between 1979 and 2009, a combination of flattening wages and weakening unions saw 
real incomes for the bottom 20% of earners decrease by 7% at the same time incomes for 
the top 5% of earners rose by 73% (Boteach et al., 2014). Average CEO salaries in the 
U.S. are now 273 times larger than their employees, and families in the top 1% of income 
earners are worth 288 times what an average family in the country is (Boteach et al., 
2014). Since the War on Poverty began, the share of national income received by the top 
1% of earners has more than doubled; the resulting income inequality is partially 
responsible for the stubborn poverty rates seen today (Boteach et al., 2014).  
The minimum wage in the U.S. has eroded over time, with the federal minimum 
wage losing 30% of its real value since 1968 (Boteach et al., 2014). As explained in 
figure 4-4, if the minimum wage was maintained in real terms at its 1968 level, it would 
currently be over $10 an hour (Boteach et al., 2014). If minimum wages were to keep 
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pace with productivity levels, that number increases to $17 an hour (Boteach et al., 2014). 
Work and income supports have acted to offset increasing inequality and decreasing 
minimum wage levels in the country, creating dependence on these social safety nets as a 
replacement for income.  
 
Figure 4-4. Minimum wage lagging behind. Reprinted from “The War on Poverty: Then and Now,” by M. 
Boteach, E. Stegman, S. Baron, T. Ross & K. Wright, 2014. 
Lack of access to education and employment has become a significant barrier to 
economic mobility. While higher education has become a prerequisite for movement into 
the middle and upper classes, this is an increasingly rare economic reality for low-income 
families, leaving their children more likely to graduate with just a high school diploma 
(Boteach et al., 2014). In 1964, using 2011 dollars, the average annual cost of tuition, 
fees, room, and board at a public university was $6,592, a number that more than doubled 
to $13,297 in 2011 (Boteach et al., 2014). Private schools saw a surge in costs of over 
137% in the same time period (Boteach et al., 2014). Pell grants were initially developed 
by the federal government in the 1970s to offset the costs of college for low-income 
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households, however, they have not kept pace with rising tuition costs. In 1979, Pell 
grants were able to cover 77% of the costs of a public four-year college, but in 2010, they 
covered just 36% of those same costs (Boteach et al., 2014). Students and families now 
increasingly rely on loans and debt to attend colleges (Boteach et al., 2014). The outcome 
is that today, the majority of individuals with bachelor’s degrees come from families 
whose earnings fall above median income levels, reinforcing income achievement gaps in 
the U.S. (Boteach et al., 2014). 
At the same time, higher education costs have risen, there has been an uptick in 
college and post-secondary education requirements by employers. According to a 2012 
Brookings study, 43% of job openings in the 100 largest metro areas in the U.S. required 
a bachelor’s degree while comparatively, just 32% of adults above the age of 25 had 
obtained a bachelor’s degree (Boteach et al., 2014). Employers who previously did not 
have minimum education requirements are now requiring 4-year degrees for the same 
jobs, and in a poor job market, college graduates are more likely to take low-wage jobs 
(Boteach et al., 2014). During times of economic uncertainty, growth largely occurs in 
the low-wage economy. In 2012, more than 40% of job growth came from low-wage 
sectors like hospitality, retail, health, and education with 8% of minimum wage workers 
and 18% of hourly workers at the time holding bachelor’s degrees (Boteach et al., 2014).  
In the 1960s, graduating with a high school diploma was sufficient to find 
adequate employment, with workforce participation high across all levels of educational 
attainment (Boteach et al., 2014). Since then, estimated employment outcomes and 
lifetime earnings for individuals with just a high school degree have fallen, as seen in 
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Figure 4-5. The employment rate for males with a high school diploma fell from 96% in 
1970 to 75% in 2011 (Boteach et al., 2014). At the same time, median annual earnings 
fell more than 50% for males with a high school degree; in 2012, the average full-time 
worker with a high school diploma earned 79% less than similar full-time workers with 
bachelor’s degrees (Boteach et al., 2014). The outcome is that workers with a high school 
degree or below are 13% more likely to see significant downward economic mobility in 
their lifetime than those with a college degree (Boteach et al., 2014).  
 
Figure 4-5. Annual earnings/employment of men with only a high school diploma, 1970-2010. Reprinted 
from “The War on Poverty: Then and Now,” by M. Boteach, E. Stegman, S. Baron, T. Ross & K. Wright, 
2014. 
Skill levels among U.S. workers also appear to be stagnating in comparison to 
other developed countries. An OECD study of workers in 22 countries found that adults 
in the U.S. scored below the international average (Boteach et al., 2014). Most 
concerning, the oldest age group of individuals aged 55-66 in the country had higher 
average literacy and problem-solving skills than the international average, while 16-24-
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year old skill levels fell below the international average, pointing to stagnating skill levels 
among younger generations (Boteach et al., 2014).  
While statistics show changing family structures, policies still assume and 
incentivize two-parent households with a female caregiver. The number of mothers who 
are single providers has increased over time, with four out of ten births in 2011 being to 
single moms as compared to one in ten during the 1960s (Boteach et al., 2014). 
Additionally, half of all children born today will live in a single-parent household for at 
least part of their childhood (Boteach et al., 2014). The U.S. has the least generous 
income and work supports for single-parent families of all developed nations (Boteach et 
al., 2014). The country has no parental leave policies, and 70% of low wage workers 
have no paid sick days (Boteach et al., 2014). 60% of mothers in the workforce have 
children under the age of 5, a number that has doubled since 1970, yet child-care 
subsidies have remained underfunded and women continue to earn just 77 cents to the 
dollar of what men earn (Boteach et al., 2014). Single parents have an above-average 
workforce participation rate; however, low wages and lack of adequate caregiving and 
income supports place a disproportionately high number of single-parent households in 
poverty (Boteach et al., 2014).  
Women’s entrance into the workforce during the 1960s and 70s initially lowered 
overall poverty rates, however, this increase in employment was used to justify 
depression of the minimum wage, with fiscal policymakers arguing that now multiple 
rather than a single wage earner would support one family. In the 1960s, just one-quarter 
of families relied on a female breadwinner as compared to the two-thirds of families that 
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do today (Boteach et al., 2014). The gains women made in entering the labor market only 
partially offset the loss in real wages men experienced (Boteach et al., 2014). Figure 4-6 
shows how all of the aforementioned factors have interacted to maintain stubborn poverty 
rates, as they are much less effective in today’s economy than in the 1960s. 
 
Figure 4-6. Comparison of statistics and policies in the 1960s and today. Reprinted from “The War on 
Poverty: Then and Now,” by M. Boteach, E. Stegman, S. Baron, T. Ross & K. Wright, 2014. 
The Myth of Welfare Dependency 
It is often argued by fiscal conservatives that welfare programs inspire laziness 
and freeloading from recipients, cultivating a system of welfare dependency. Under this 
assumption, policymakers have cut cash income supports and limited access to benefits 
throughout the 80s, 90s, and early 2000s. While the Obama administration took steps to 
expand social income supports, the Trump administration has returned to a fiscally 
conservative perspective, facilitating an uptick in barriers to welfare like Medicaid work 
requirements (Hanna, 2019). From a neoclassical economic perspective, social transfers 
create the opportunity for moral hazard among recipients as large income support 
payments incentivize individuals to work less. These economists and like-minded fiscal 
conservatives argue that income supports and government benefits actually reward 
94 
 
individuals for their impoverishment, and this “moral hazard” is what leads to poverty 
persistence and reliance on the welfare state.  
Global research on cash-transfer systems has found “no systematic evidence that 
cash transfer programs discourage work”. In reality, data showed that the majority of 
individuals receiving cash benefits were employed prior to the date they began receiving 
those benefits (Thompson, 2018). In Indonesia, short-term outcomes of cash income 
support programs included positive outcomes in health and education, while long-term 
results saw increased positive outcomes in child development and education levels 
(Hanna, 2019). Similar research in Uganda and Nigeria found that the implementation of 
cash-grant programs was correlated with an increase in working hours and income levels 
(Thompson, 2018). In the U.S., economists have found that even when income support 
programs effectively reduced the number of hours an individual worked, these hours 
were used for seeking better employment opportunities and furthering education 
(Thompson, 2018). Access to prenatal care via Medicaid has been shown to lower rates 
of obesity, increase high school graduation rates, and raise long-term incomes for 
children in those households, making them less likely to receive welfare as adults 
(Thompson, 2018). Fully funded income supports thus decrease long-term dependence on 
the welfare system rather than incentivize individual apathy. 
Poverty, Crime, and Concentrated Disadvantage 
Community Impacts of Social Exclusion  
Low-income communities experience social isolation and exclusion from the 
larger society. Social isolation occurs when individuals and communities are rendered 
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unable to interact or contact those outside of the community (Stewart, Makwarimba, 
Reutter, Veenstra, Raphael & Love, 2009). Research has linked lower socioeconomic 
status to a greater chance of experiencing social isolation, as well as feeling a lack of 
belonging to larger communities and society (Stewart et al., 2009). Constraints on time 
and resources can limit individuals’ ability to interact with larger communities and 
maintain social connections outside of the home; lower-income individuals are more 
likely to report social isolation due to structural and interpersonal barriers (Stewart et al., 
2009).  
Brian Barry, a moral philosopher who is often cited in this research, defines social 
exclusion as a separate phenomenon from social isolation. According to Barry, social 
isolation is individual non-participation, whereas social exclusion is the “inability to 
participate in institutions patronized by the majority” (Barry, 1998). Individuals are 
socially excluded due to the choices of others; as wealthier individuals opt out of larger 
public experiences and institutions; it creates an inequality of opportunity. This ‘opting 
out’ undermines social solidarity by limiting common experiences (Barry, 1998). Barry 
states that this can be remedied by creating shared experiences like engagement with 
public institutions, and historically, increased economic parity between groups has 
mitigated social exclusion (Barry, 1998). In a country with a market economy and liberal 
democratic institutions, such as the U.S., society will continue to divide into those who 
use public institutions and those who can afford to opt-out and use private ones (Barry, 
1998). Common examples of socially exclusionary institutions are gated, and public 
communities, public and private education systems, and private health insurance as 
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opposed to Medicaid (Barry, 1998). One stark example of how this social exclusion plays 
out is in the relationship communities have with police. While low-income, urban 
communities experience both extreme policing and a lack of police protection, gated 
communities are able to employ private security guards, creating very different 
perceptions of and experiences with law enforcement. 
This inequality of opportunity extends to employment, with job connections and 
resources concentrated in socially exclusive communities. In socially excluded 
communities, young people see fewer benefits to education as well as opportunities for 
employment, facilitating suppressed academic motivation leading to higher truancy and 
dropout rates (Barry, 1998). Low-income communities are isolated from the social 
contacts and networks that allow for economic mobility, with data concluding that 
residents of these neighborhoods see fewer friends with college degrees and stable 
employment (Rankin & Quane, 2000).  
Social exclusion and a lack of shared experience weaken social solidarity (Barry, 
1998). Individuals with the resources and capacity to ‘opt-out’ have greater access to 
politicians and political resources (Barry, 1998). This inequality of access to the political 
system creates biased constituent input (Barry, 1998). Politicians are thus more likely to 
pass legislation demonizing the poor and privileging the wealthy (Barry, 1998). Without 
common experiences, equality of opportunity, and equitable input into policymaking, 
social exclusion persists and acts to deepen existing social cleavages.  
There is a direct, positive correlation between community cohesion and health 
outcomes, as social inclusion can mitigate the negative impacts of stressors like 
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discrimination (Hamilton, Cardoso, Hummer & Padilla, 2011). This has been analyzed by 
looking at the health of individuals who have immigrated to the U.S. Researchers found 
that immigrants coming from close-knit communities often arrived in the U.S. in good 
health (Hamilton et al., 2011). The children of these immigrants, however, saw a 
significant drop-off in positive health outcomes (Hamilton et al., 2011). Whereas in other 
countries close-knit communities provide emotional, social, and financial support, social 
exclusion in the U.S. leads to negative health outcomes, as individuals find themselves 
more vulnerable to the impacts of stress (Hamilton et al., 2011). While close-knit 
communities within areas of concentrated disadvantage exist, they still experience 
marginalization and disenfranchisement from wealthier society. 
The School to Prison Pipeline 
The school to prison pipeline is the process by which students of color from low-
income communities are pushed from schools into the criminal justice system at an early 
age. Extreme disciplinary processes for criminalized student behavior introduces young 
people to law enforcement systems and turns schools into prison-like environments. 
Experts on the matter pinpoint two main drivers of this process: zero-tolerance policies, 
and police presence on campuses (Dolan, Slaughter-Johnson & Sampson, 2018).  
Police presence, in the form of School Resource Officers (SROs), can both 
negatively impact students and increase early contact with law enforcement. Most states 
require teachers and staff to report all student misbehavior to SROs (Cole, 2019). The 
involvement of SROs in minor disciplinary issues has been known to escalate these 
incidents, and create more volatile situations (Cole, 2019). If student behavior is 
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considered disruptive, SROs have the power to forcibly arrest students on school grounds 
(Dolan et al., 2018). Schools with SROs make referrals to the juvenile legal system for 
“disorderly conduct” at a rate five times greater than those without (Dolan et al., 2018). 
Police presence in the form of SROs has led to more students being removed from 
schools. 
  Underfunded public schools with overworked staff and low-resourced teachers 
are more likely to lean on police presence. Students from low-income neighborhoods are 
more likely to experience external stressors which can manifest in misbehavior at school 
(Cole, 2019). So, while students in low-income districts have increased behavioral needs, 
they are in the schools least equipped to support them. Overworked teachers are more 
likely to refer students to SROs when classroom situations escalate (Dolan et al., 2018). 
Increasingly, SROs have become regular members of school staff, replacing counselors 
and psychiatrists in low-income schools (Dolan et al., 2018). In 2016, students who were 
Latinx and Black were 1.4 and 1.2 times more likely than white students to find 
themselves in a school with an SRO and no guidance counselor (Dolan et al., 2018). The 
Department of Education’s Civil Rights Data Collection showed that in 2015, in over half 
of the middle schools where Black students made up more than three-quarters of the 
student body there was at least one SRO (Dolan et al., 2018). At the same time, just under 
a third of schools where at least three-quarters of the student body were white had an 




Zero tolerance policies create overly harsh punishments for student misbehavior. 
These policies increase rates of suspensions and expulsions in schools, normalizing the 
experience of being punished and expelled (Cole, 2019). Research has shown that just 
one suspension can double the likelihood a student drops out of school (Dolan et al., 
2018). Students are more than twice as likely to be arrested during a suspension or 
expulsion (Cole, 2019). Kicking students out of school hinders their socialization and 
increases the likelihood of contact with criminal activity, as it removes them from a 
structured and supervised environment (Cole, 2019). Students who are suspended or 
expelled are nearly three times more likely than their peers to be involved with the 
juvenile justice system (Cole, 2019). Both dropping out and experiencing school 
punishments increase the likelihood a student will become involved with the criminal 
justice system (Cole, 2019).  
Racial and economic inequities exist in school disciplinary systems. Underfunded 
schools and schools with large Black populations have higher rates of zero-tolerance 
policies (Cole, 2019). Across the country, students who are Black and Native American 
are suspended and expelled at significantly higher rates than white students (Cole, 2019). 
In 2014, while Black students represented 15.5% of all public-school students, they made 
up 46% of the students who received multiple suspensions during the school year (Cole, 
2019). Native American students made up 1.1% of the total public-school population and 
accounted for 2% of all referrals to law enforcement (Dolan et al., 2018). All students of 
color are more frequently and harshly punished for committing the same, minor offenses 
as white students (Cole, 2019). Labeling students as bad, violent, or criminal, creates 
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stigma in schools and communities. Students who feel stigmatized can become frustrated 
and angry at schools who label them as such, hindering motivation to succeed 
academically (Cole, 2019). 
Low-income schools inflict harsher punishments on students. Schools in New 
York were found to have a positive correlation between the number of low-income 
students and suspension rates (Dolan et al., 2018). Researchers noted that the New York 
school district with the highest proportion of low-income students also had the highest 
suspension rate (Dolan et al., 2018). Other research has found that large low-income 
school student populations correspond to higher student arrest rates (Dolan et al., 2018). 
That same report concluded that “poverty is a strong predictor of school exclusion” 
(Dolan et al., 2018). Truancy can be more narrowly defined and harshly punished in 
different states (Dolan et al., 2018). An average annual 150,000 truancy cases in the U.S. 
regularly result in fines, loss of custody, foster care placement, and even incarceration 
and probation for students and parents (Dolan et al., 2018). A majority of the students 
who are identified as truant and punished for truancy are from low-income households 
(Dolan et al., 2018).  
High incarceration rates in low-income communities create additional challenges 
in education. Children with an incarcerated parent are more likely to experience poverty, 
food insecurity, homelessness, and health problems (Damron, 2018). The economic and 
emotional toll of parental incarceration affects children's well-being, and they are more 
likely to struggle with aggression, depression, and anxiety (Damron, 2018). Research also 
shows that children with an incarcerated parent are statistically more likely to associate 
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with “delinquent” peers, engage in fights, and miss school (Damron, 2018). Overall, they 
report higher levels of difficulty concentrating in school and poorer educational outcomes 
(Damron, 2018). While just 4% of all children will be suspended or expelled from school, 
this number jumps to 23% for children with an incarcerated parent (PEW, 2010). These 
are the experiences that reinforce the school to prison pipeline and engender it to lower-
income communities. 
High Incarceration Rates in Low-Income Communities 
On average, incarcerated individuals are more likely to have lower incomes prior 
to incarceration than their unincarcerated counterparts. In 2015, the Prison Policy 
Initiative reported that prior to being incarcerated, individuals aged 27-42 had a median 
annual income of $19,185 (Rabuy & Kopf, 2015). As seen in Table 4-1, this number falls 
41 percentage points below non-incarcerated individuals of a similar age (Rabuy & Kopf, 
2015). Across gender, race, and ethnicity, incarcerated individuals reported earning 
significantly less money than non-incarcerated individuals (Rabuy & Kopf, 2015). 
Incarceration also incurs financial burdens on families in the form of court fees, justice 
system fines, bonds, debt, and reduced income (FPWA, 2019). While incarceration can 
reduce household income by removing a caregiver, it is also costly to maintain contact 
with an incarcerated family member (Damron, 2018). Payments for phone calls and 
transportation to visit incarcerated individuals falls upon the household (Damron, 2018). 
Additionally, the social stigma of incarcerated family members can reduce access to 
housing, employment, and education (FPWA, 2019). There remains significant room for 
research on the topic of income level and incarceration to discover more about this 
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relationship. So while it is important to note the income differential, there must be more 
work done to ascertain how these income levels are measured and how this can be 
applied.  
Table 2. 2014 Medial Annual Incomes for Non-incarcerated Individuals and Incarcerated Individuals Prior 
to Incarceration, Ages 27-42, in 2014 dollars. Source: “Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the pre-
incarceration incomes of the imprisoned,” by B. Rabuy & D. Kopf, 2015. 
 
Incarcerated 




Percentage difference between 
median annual incomes for 
incarcerated people prior to 
incarceration and non-incarcerated 
persons 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women 
All $19,650 $13,890 $41,250 $23, 745 52% 42% 
Black $17,625 $12,735 $31,245 $24,255 44% 47% 
Hispanic $19,740 $11,820 $30,000 $15,000 34% 21% 
White $21,975 $15,480 $47,505 $26,130 54% 41% 
A number of factors lead to elevated incarceration rates in low-income 
communities, higher levels of police presence and government monitoring being one such 
factor. Households that receive welfare benefits are scrutinized more heavily, subject to a 
number of eligibility requirements, and have less privacy (FPWA, 2019). A 
corresponding disproportionately high number of low-income families have experienced 
welfare interventions, with court systems mandating child support agreements and family 
separations (FPWA, 2019). Increased interactions with the courts incur more justice 
system fines and fees, a burden felt more heavily than in higher-income households that 
are subject to less scrutiny in the first place (FPWA, 2019).  
Over-policing in low-income communities has been shown to have racial biases 
and cause widespread harm. Broken-windows policing, a strategy borne from social 
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experiments, became popular in the early 1990s, particularly in low-income communities 
in urban centers (Hatzenbuehler, Keyes, Hamilton, Uddin & Galea, 2015). The idea was 
that visible signs of disorder like loitering, graffiti, and drug use increase the rate at 
which crimes are committed in that area (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). Police 
departments who adopted this policy thus focused on cleaning up streets and maintaining 
order as a way of discouraging more major crimes (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). The 
reality of this, as researched in Chicago by social scientists Robert Sampson and Stephen 
Raudenbush, is that individual perceptions of social disorder are highly influenced by 
racial demographics (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). If a neighborhood has a large 
Black population, it is more likely to be given a higher rating of social disorder than 
similar, whiter neighborhoods (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). Broken-windows 
policing morphed into ‘stop and frisk’ policies, reinforcing an antagonistic relationship 
between police officers and low-income, urban, non-white communities (Hatzenbuehler 
et al., 2015). These aggressive policing tactics have been shown not only to harm 
communities in which they are implemented but also to fail to significantly mitigate 
crime (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2015). Per Robert Sampson, a majority of the U.S. prison 
population comes from just a small number of these Black, low-income neighborhoods, 
primarily located in major cities (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2015). 
Incarceration harms communities in a number of ways. A Columbia public health 
study found that neighborhoods with high rates of incarceration and large prison and 
parole populations have elevated diagnoses of major depressive and generalized anxiety 
disorders (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2015). These results hold for individuals who have never 
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been to jail or prison but live these in communities (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2015). 
Community incarceration rates are positively correlated with unemployment rates, mental 
health hospitalizations, and truancy within the community (FPWA, 2019). These 
statistics are indicative of the widespread harm caused by the over-policing of and high 
incarceration rates in low-income communities. 
High incarceration rates create a constant movement of individuals in and out of 
the community. This engenders large transient populations, high rates of single-parent 
households, and a lack of consistent financial investments back into the community 
(Rabuy & Kopf, 2015). This depletion of social and financial capital is a source of 
poverty persistence and stagnating local economies (Rabuy & Kopf, 2015). As 
individuals transition back into the community, they find fewer jobs and economic 
opportunities (Rabuy & Kopf, 2015). While well-paid jobs become increasingly difficult 
to find in these communities, crime remains a consistent and viable option for 
individuals, raising rates of recidivism (Rabuy & Kopf, 2015). While these communities 
see economic losses, others are profiting off of high incarceration rates. Communities 
with populations employed by prisons see almost $25,000 of income generated per 
incarcerated individual (Rabuy & Kopf, 2015). The over-policing of low-income 
communities stunts their economic growth and leads to higher rates of criminal activity.  
Poverty, Unemployment, and Mass Incarceration 
The system of mass incarcerations is rooted in the over-policing of low-income 
communities of color. Aggressive policing tactics, racially-biased laws, the War on 
Drugs, mandatory sentencing, and harsh penalization of parole violations have led to an 
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unprecedented increase in the size of the U.S. prison population, disproportionately made 
up of low-income individuals of color (DeFina & Hannon, 2013). The U.S. prison 
population has increased by 700% since the 1970s, and today, our country is responsible 
for 2.3 million incarcerated individuals (FPWA, 2019). These numbers have dramatically 
outpaced incarceration rates in other OECD countries; U.S. incarceration rates are five to 
ten times greater than other OECD countries that see no significant difference in crime 
rates to the U.S. (Western & Pettit, 2000).  
Mass incarceration has been devastating for low-income, non-white communities. 
Exemplified in Figure 4-7, incarceration rates have dramatically increased for Black men 
without high school educations, normalizing this life experience both within and outside 
of these communities (Western & Pettit, 2010). In 2015, 32% of the U.S. population was 
categorized as Black or Latinx compared to 56% of incarcerated individuals (FPWA, 
2019). Contrary to these statistics, evidence has shown that a number of different crimes 
occur equally across distinctions of race and class (FPWA, 2019). Inequities occur in the 
policing, prosecution, and sentencing of low-income and non-white individuals (FPWA, 
2019). Incarceration is most common for individuals in their twenties and early thirties, a 
time when families and job skills are often established. The number of working-age 
individuals with a criminal record in the U.S. is about the same as the amount with a 
four-year college degree, both being around a third of the population (FPWA, 2019. 




Figure 4-7. Percentage of Men Aged Twenty to Thirty-Four in Prison or Jail by Race/Ethnicity and 
Education in 1980 and 2008. Reprinted from “Incarceration & Social Inequality”, by B. Western & B. 
Pettit, 2010. 
 Mass incarceration is invisible, cumulative, and generational in its impacts on 
social and economic inequality (Western & Pettit, 2010). Communities that bear the brunt 
of mass incarceration experience significant social exclusion, and institutionalized 
populations exist outside of everyday life and “normal” social awareness. Rendering 
these experiences invisible to larger society facilitates limits the understanding 
individuals have of mass incarceration and the harm that occurs in these communities. A 
primary example of this is the removal of institutionalized individuals from official 
measurements of poverty and unemployment. As shown in Figure 4-8, in 2008, the 
official employment rate for Black, male individuals without a high school degree was 
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40%, however, once institutionalized individuals are added into the calculation the 
employment rate drops to 25% (Western & Pettit, 2010). Black men without a high 
school degree were more likely to be incarcerated than employed in 2008 (Western & 
Pettit, 2010). The official poverty measure also excludes institutionalized populations, 
and multiple calculations of the poverty rate that include incarcerated individuals place it 
at least 10% higher than the current OPM (DeFina & Hannon, 2013). While there is an 
argument for the exclusion of this data in official measurements, it does decrease the 
visibility of mass incarceration and its economic and social impacts.  
 
Figure 4-8. Employment to Population Ratio for African American Men Aged 20-34 with less than Twelve 
Years of Schooling from 1980 to 2008. Reprinted from “Incarceration & Social Inequality”, by B. Western 
& B. Pettit, 2010. 
Mass incarceration cumulatively impacts communities and individuals in that 
those who are most heavily affected by it already have fewer opportunities for social and 
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economic mobility (Western & Pettit, 2010). Incarceration diminishes economic 
opportunity, correlating to an expected 11% drop in hourly wages, a 9-week decrease in 
annual employment, and a 40% loss in lifetime earnings (Western & Pettit, 2010), (PEW, 
2010). Western and Pettit theorize that this post-incarceration loss in income is caused by 
prison conditions unconducive to employment, a differential in time spent in the labor 
force, and the stigmatization of incarcerated individuals (Western & Pettit, 2010). By 48, 
an individual who has been incarcerated will see an average $179,000 income deficit to 
those who have not (PEW, 2010). Of the formerly incarcerated men who fell into the 
lowest quintile of earnings in 1986, two-thirds remained in that same category in 2006 
(PEW, 2010). In those same 20 years, 15% of men who had no criminal justice system 
involvement were able to move from the bottom quintile to the top quintile of earnings, 
while just 2% of formerly incarcerated men made that same jump (PEW, 2010). While 
the U.S. saw a 2.9% real increase in GDP from 1980 to 2004, the official poverty rate 
dropped by just 0.3% drop (DeFina & Hannon, 2013). This is often partially attributed to 
the loss of household income due to incarceration. 
The impacts of mass incarceration are generational, as the repercussions are felt 
by the entire family system. Over 50% of all incarcerated individuals have children under 
the age of 18 (Western & Pettit, 2010). 35 years ago, 1 in every 125 children had an 
incarcerated parent, and in 2008, this increased to 1 in 28, around 2.7 million children 
(PEW, 2010). Two-thirds of these parents were incarcerated for non-violent offenses 
(PEW, 2010). Men are more likely to be incarcerated, often placing the burden of running 
a single-income household onto women (Western & Pettit, 2010). Prior to being 
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incarcerated, more than two-thirds of all male inmates were employed, and over half 
were the primary source of financial support for their children (PEW, 2010). During a 
father’s incarceration, family incomes fall by an estimated 22%, and even after leaving 
prison, household wages are on average 15% below what they were (PEW, 2010). 
Incarceration can also limit individual and household access to public benefits. Some 
states have raised eligibility requirements for incarcerated individuals while others 
completely bar them from receiving TANF, SNAP, and housing assistance (Center for 
Community Change, n.d.) 
In the U.S., mass incarceration has developed as a form of government 
intervention in the marketplace, reallocating labor and acting as a ‘safety net’ for those 
experiencing poverty. For those struggling to find formal employment in society, 
incarceration incorporates them into the labor market via the criminal justice system, 
where they are forced to work for an average of 86 cents a day (Sawyer, 2017). 
Corporations that use incarcerated labor to produce goods are beholden to significantly 
fewer labor stipulations and no price reductions, incentivizing this exploitation of forced 
labor. At the same time, as fiscally conservative welfare policies have lowered social 
welfare supports, the criminal justice system has stepped in to manage those individuals 
falling through widening gaps in the social safety net. Unsurprisingly, as work for 
welfare policies have increased, so have incarceration rates. Mass incarceration in the 
U.S. has thus effectively become a government intervention for reducing poverty rates; it 
allows for politicians to plead fiscal conservatism as costs of incarceration increase 
exponentially and the poverty rate remains flat.  
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A Marxian Theory of Poverty and Inequality 
Since its beginning, the Marxian tradition has theorized poverty and inequality as 
functionally necessary components of the capitalist mode of production, they are inherent 
and expected outcomes of capitalism. A major function of the capitalist mode of 
production is the reproduction of existing social stratifications (Peet, 1975). Income 
inequality ensures the variety of workers necessary to maintain the division of labor 
which underpins the capitalist mode of production. Socio-economic classes are 
reproduced, in part, via the wage mechanism, which limits economic mobility. Depressed 
wages maintain inequality and ensure unequal access to skills, creating a hierarchy within 
the working class (Peet, 1975). This inequitable access to education and resources allows 
the capitalist mode of production to reproduce itself in an increasingly stratified manner, 
maintaining a skills hierarchy and restricting the supply of skilled labor (Peet, 1975).  
The capitalist mode of production produces a permanent underclass of 
unemployed and impoverished individuals. Continually decreasing costs of production 
and intensification in the division of labor increase productivity and, increasing the 
potential for the creation of surplus value (Marx, 1985). As this occurs, the relative 
demand for labor falls causing unemployment to rise and creating a ‘reserve army of 
labour’ (Marx, 1985). This under and unemployed population is necessary for the 
capitalist mode of production (Marx, 1985). Its existence creates an environment of fear 
and stress which causes desperate workers to accept lower wages (Peet, 1975). Inequality 
and poverty are thus intentional, self-perpetuating, mechanized aspects of the capitalist 
mode of production. 
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The capitalist mode of production is predicated on individualistic and reductionist 
social relations that isolate individuals and communities. As social relations are reduced 
to economic interactions, individual worth is determined by the potential for individuals 
to be assets or burdens. This is an unconscious process that reinforces and reproduces the 
capitalist mode of production, limiting the capacity for empathy and humanization. This 
shows up in the fiscally conservative argument that poverty reflects personal failings. 
From this perspective, social welfare programs reward this failure and take money away 
from those who have worked for it. This argument entirely dismisses the required labor 
of the middle, working, and lower-classes necessary for capitalists to maintain their 
wealth.  
Whether manifested as inequities in education, health, or community 
development, policies created within a capitalist system will always concentrate wealth in 
the hands of those with access to the greatest amount of resources, and actively 
disadvantage laborers. Failing to address these policies for what they are, not discrete, 
individual acts, but rather a system bent upon creating surplus-value for those with 
capital, is one of the reasons poverty, inequality, and concentrated disadvantage persist. 
Even though there exist a number of interventions and anti-poverty measures that could 
be improved upon, while the U.S. economy remains dependent upon the capitalist mode 
of production, there will be structural limitations to the benefits of these policies.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 Poverty in the United States exists and persists because poverty alleviation 
policies focus on changing individual behaviors rather than addressing systemic barriers 
to economic mobility. These barriers are the result of an unwillingness to fundamentally 
address the source of poverty, our current economic system. Inaccurate measurement, 
health and educational inequities, areas of concentrated disadvantage, and mass 
incarceration reflect this political failing. At the same time, they act to reinforce 
conservative economic beliefs centering individual choice as the main determinant of 
economic outcomes. Lowered educational attainment, incarceration, and health outcomes 
are all pointed to as examples of this individual choice, however, when looked at from a 
broad, systemic perspective, it becomes clear that individual choice pales in comparison 
to larger economic and social systems. In order to effectively eliminate poverty in the 
U.S., there needs to be a fundamental change in how it is viewed and a greater 
understanding of what the true determinants of economic mobility are. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the working poor and non-white individuals are 
bearing the brunt of the public health and economic crisis. Individuals in low-wage jobs 
like grocery stores and chain restaurants both have access to fewer benefits like paid 
leave, and are considered essential employees. They are forced to face exposure on a 
daily basis because they do not have the means to stop working. Black individuals are
113 
 
overwhelmingly represented in virus-related fatalities while Native communities are 
fearing massive upheaval in the wake of the virus. This is due to more than just biases 
within the health system. Living in poverty in the U.S. has long been a comorbidity for 
poor health and social consequences; the pandemic is simply exposing how drastically 
the system of poverty predisposes individuals to these devastating outcomes. Addressing 
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